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THIN RATIONALITY REVIEW
Jacob Gersen* and Adrian Vermeule**
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts review and set aside agency
action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.” In a common formulation of ra-
tionality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of
agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have taken
a hard look. We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpreta-
tion of rationality review—a thin version. Under a robust range of conditions,
rational agencies have good reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate,
nonrational, or arbitrary. Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or in-
ternally inconsistent, it simply rests on an appreciation of the limits of reason,
especially in administrative policymaking. Agency decisionmaking is nonideal
decisionmaking; what would be rational under ideal conditions is rarely a
relevant question for agencies. Rather, agencies make decisions under con-
straints of scarce time, information, and resources. Those constraints imply
that agencies will frequently have excellent reasons to depart from idealized
first-order conceptions of administrative rationality.
Thin rationality review describes the law in action. Administrative law text-
books typically suggest that the State Farm decision in 1983 inaugurated an
era of stringent judicial review of agency decisionmaking for rationality. That
is flatly wrong at the level of the Supreme Court, where agencies have won no
less than 92 percent of the sixty-four arbitrariness challenges decided on the
merits since the 1982 Term. The Court’s precedent embodies an approach to
rationality review that is highly tolerant of the inescapable limits of agency
rationality when making decisions under uncertainty. State Farm is not repre-
sentative of the law; beloved of law professors, and frequently cited in rote
fashion by judges, State Farm nonetheless lies well outside the mainstream of
the Supreme Court’s precedent. To encapsulate the Court’s approach to ra-
tionality review, the best choice would be the powerfully deferential opinion in
Baltimore Gas, decided in the same Term as State Farm. Plausibly, rather
than living in the era of hard look review or the State Farm era, we live in the
era of Baltimore Gas.
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Introduction
Under Section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
courts “shall” set aside agency action that is “arbitrary [and] capricious.”1
The conventional antonym of “arbitrary and capricious” is rational; as the
D.C. Circuit puts it, “[t]he ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard deems the
agency action presumptively valid provided the action meets a minimum
rationality standard.”2 Hence, courts applying the arbitrary and capricious
test review the rationality of agency decisions.
The traditional and highly deferential approach, under the constitu-
tional law of due process, equated rationality review of agency decisionmak-
ing with rational-basis review of legislation.3 Starting with Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe4 in 1971, however, a vast and baroque
caselaw elaborated the requirements of rational agency decisionmaking
under the APA. And in 1983, the Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Asso-
ciation v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm)5 specifi-
cally held that rationality review of agencies under 706(2)(A) should be
more demanding than rational-basis review.6 In a common formulation of
rationality review, courts must either take a “hard look” at the rationality of
agency decisionmaking, or at least ensure that agencies themselves have
taken a hard look at the relevant problems. Hard look review is taken to
encompass multiple quasi-procedural obligations that, taken together, en-
sure agency rationality.7
We will propose a much less demanding and intrusive interpretation of
the “arbitrary and capricious” standard in section 706(2)(A). The argument
has both prescriptive and descriptive components. Prescriptively, we urge
that rationality is a much thinner notion than some commentators seem to
think, and that rational decisionmaking requires far less from agencies than
lawyers tend to realize.8 Courts have sometimes adopted an excessively intru-
sive approach because, acting in the best of faith, they have misunderstood
what rationality requires. In particular, they have failed to grasp a crucial
twist: under a robust range of conditions, rational agencies may have good
reason to decide in a manner that is inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary.9
1. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
2. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quot-
ing Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 194 F.3d 130, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
3. See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 181–82 (1935).
4. 401 U.S. 402, 416–17 (1971).
5. 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 (1983).
6. See State Farm, 463 U.S at 43 n.9 (“We do not view as equivalent the presumption of
constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity
afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate.”).
7. See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L.
Rev. 721, 737–39 (2014).
8. See infra Part II.
9. This reads “arbitrary” in a decision-theory sense rather than a legal sense. Our argu-
ment is precisely that where agencies have valid second-order reasons for acting inaccurately,
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Although this claim is seemingly paradoxical or internally inconsistent,
it simply rests on an appreciation of the limits of reason, especially in ad-
ministrative policymaking. Agency decisionmaking is nonideal decisionmak-
ing; what would be rational under ideal conditions is rarely a relevant
question for agencies. Rather, agencies make decisions under constraints of
scarce time, information, and resources. Those constraints imply that agen-
cies will frequently have excellent reasons to depart from idealized first-or-
der conceptions of administrative rationality. We will thus examine a series
of limitations to agency rationality and to the communication of reasons by
agencies, and argue for an approach to rationality review that takes these
limitations seriously—thin rationality review.
In a simplistic and idealized conception of administrative rationality,
which is rarely articulated in explicit terms but which implicitly underlies
many judicial decisions, rational agencies should (1) attempt to choose the
best policy among the feasible options, after considering all relevant statu-
tory factors and policy variables, and then (2) explain to interested parties
and to the court the agency’s reasons for thinking that the chosen policy is
best, as compared to the alternatives.10 This conception turns out to be rid-
dled with legal mistakes, conceptual slips, and institutional problems.
As to (1), under the best reading of the arbitrary and capricious test,
agencies have no legal obligation to consider all policy variables that strike
judges as arguably relevant. Agencies often have good reason to choose poli-
cies that do not necessarily represent the best feasible option. Agencies may
choose policies that the agency has not compared to other feasible options.
And agencies may choose policies that do not even produce net benefits in
the case at hand. The critical issue here is uncertainty, which sometimes
gives agencies good second-order reasons to depart from the simplistic first-
order conception of rationality under conditions we will identify.
As to (2), agencies may find it difficult to explain their reasons to gener-
alist judges on reviewing courts, even, or especially, when those reasons are
valid. This is the problem of tacit expertise—tacit knowledge held by experts,
which is costly to transmit to nonexperts, and which is always distorted in
the transmission. We do not suggest that agencies should never be obliged to
communicate reasons to courts, only that rationality review should calibrate
that obligation with sensitivity to the risk that genuine reasons are some-
times incommunicable between experts and generalists, or at least costly to
communicate. One of the main reasons agencies exist at all is specialization,
and specialization creates information asymmetries. Asymmetric informa-
tion implies, in turn, that the knowledge agencies possess cannot always be
nonrationally, or arbitrarily, they should not be deemed to have acted in an “arbitrary and
capricious” manner within the meaning of Section 706(2)(A) of the APA. See Adrian
Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law, 44 J. Legal Stud. S475,
S482–89 (2015).
10. See infra Section II.A.
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effectively evaluated by reviewing courts or other generalist institutions, and
sometimes it cannot even be effectively conveyed to those institutions.11
All this is negative critique, but our positive conception is straightfor-
ward. In contrast to thick rationality review, the thin version posits that
agencies are (merely) obliged to make decisions on the basis of reasons. Sec-
ond-or-higher order reasons may, in appropriate cases, satisfy that obliga-
tion. What is excluded by the arbitrary and capricious standard is genuinely
ungrounded agency decisionmaking, in the sense that the agency cannot jus-
tify its action even as a response to the limits of reason. While truly capri-
cious decisionmaking in this sense is no doubt uncommon, it does exist; the
caselaw contains examples.12 For purposes of interpreting section 706(2)(A),
“arbitrary and capricious” action is unreasoned agency action.
So much for prescription. Descriptively, our approach fits some but not
all of the caselaw; it neither justifies all extant decisions, nor condemns them
all.13 Current law is actually a mixed bag—far more so than one might think
from reading administrative law textbooks, which typically suggest that State
Farm inaugurated an era of stringent judicial review of agency decisionmak-
ing for rationality. As we will see, that suggestion is flatly wrong at the level
of the Supreme Court. At that level, agencies almost never lose. Indeed, the
facts show that State Farm itself is an outlier. Starting in October Term 1982,
when State Farm was decided, the Court has passed on the merits of arbi-
trariness challenges sixty-four times.14 Of those, agencies have lost arbitrary
and capricious challenges only five times—a remarkable win-rate of 92
percent.15
At the level of doctrine and announced principles, many of the modern
cases feature strong rebukes of lower courts for excessive interference, or
11. We put aside the limited cases, in the federal system, in which specialized agencies are
reviewed by specialized Article III courts. Most federal agency action that is reviewed by any
Article III court is reviewed by a general-purpose Article III court. See generally James E.
Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 643 (2004).We also put aside review by specialized Article I courts.
12. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 35–39 (discussing Judulang v. Holder, 132 S.
Ct. 476 (2011)).
13. See infra Part I.
14. See infra Appendix.
15. See infra Appendix. This aggregate statistic depends on the classification of some
cases as either statutory or arbitrariness holdings. A few cases are blurry because the Court
rules against the agency on alternative grounds, both statutory interpretation and arbitrariness
review. In very few cases, there is ongoing confusion about the so-called second step of analy-
sis under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
these decisions fold arbitrariness analysis into Chevron Step Two. See, e.g., Judulang v. Holder,
132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating that Chevron Step Two examines whether the agency
interpretation is “arbitrary or capricious in substance” (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ.
& Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011))). However, there are not enough debata-
ble cases of either type to make any real difference; even on the most conservative possible
estimate (the estimate maximally biased against our thesis), agencies win arbitrariness chal-
lenges in the Supreme Court about 88 percent of the time. We provide further details in the
Appendix. The overall trend in the data is clear: it is very rare indeed for the Supreme Court to
hold an agency action arbitrary and capricious.
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specifically disavow idealized conceptions of rationality review developed by
lower courts. Over against State Farm there stands a long line of decidedly
deferential decisions running from Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.16 in 1983 to FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc.17 and EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.18 in recent years. (The
exceptions like Judulang v. Holder19 stand out, and are more easily recalled,
precisely because they are rare.) This line of precedent embodies an ap-
proach to rationality review that is more aware of, and tolerant of, the ines-
capable limits of rationality when agencies make decisions under
uncertainty—the chronic condition of decisionmaking in the administrative
state. State Farm is not representative of the law. Beloved by law professors
and frequently cited in rote fashion by judges, it nonetheless lies well outside
the mainstream of the Supreme Court’s precedent.
Of course there are many possible explanations for these data, which we
will examine in detail. Selection effects must be accounted for, both at the
stage of the selection of cases for litigation, and at the stage of selection of
cases for review by the Supreme Court. Agencies’ won-loss record in arbi-
trariness challenges before the D.C. Circuit is somewhat less impressive, al-
though the data is sketchy. (As we will see, there may well be a connection
between the D.C. Circuit’s episodic bullying of agencies and the Supreme
Court’s marked tendency to validate agency decisions in the face of legal
challenges.) At a minimum, however, administrative lawyers need to reas-
sess, perhaps dramatically, the folk wisdom about the era of hard look re-
view. Forced to pick one case to encapsulate the Court’s approach to
rationality review, the best choice would be the powerfully deferential opin-
ion in Baltimore Gas, decided in the same term as State Farm. Plausibly,
rather than living in the era of hard look review or the State Farm era, we
live in the era of Baltimore Gas.
In Baltimore Gas, decided the same term as State Farm, the Supreme
Court upheld the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s determination that, for
purposes of licensing under the National Environmental Policy Act, the per-
manent storage of certain nuclear wastes would be assumed to have no sig-
nificant environmental impact (the “zero-release” assumption).20 Per Judge
Bazelon, the D.C. Circuit had struck down the agency’s judgment on arbi-
trariness grounds.21 The Court reversed that decision in emphatic terms.
Quoting Vermont Yankee, Justice O’Connor wrote that “[a]dministrative de-
cisions should be set aside in this context, as in every other, only for sub-
stantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute . . . not
16. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
17. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
18. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
19. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
20. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 87–88.
21. Id. at 95.
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simply because the court is unhappy with the result reached.”22 Moreover, “a
reviewing court must remember that the Commission is making predictions,
within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When examin-
ing this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of
fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.”23 In our
view, it is time to stop discussing State Farm whenever arbitrariness review is
mentioned. The better reflex—better theoretically, and more faithful to the
caselaw—would be for lawyers to mention “Baltimore Gas” review.
Part I lays out the descriptive claim. We begin by distinguishing two
versions of State Farm—the case itself on the one hand, and on the other,
the broader culture of hard look review for which the case has become a
symbol and shorthand. We then state some basic findings about the Court’s
caselaw since State Farm, consider various explanations for those findings,
and underscore their inconsistency with a simple narrative about the preva-
lence of hard look review. Although there are many possible explanations for
the facts, it is clearly false that the Court is in any sense committed to strin-
gent supervision of agency rationality.
In Part II, the prescriptive section, we discuss the limitations of agency
rationality, especially when making decisions under uncertainty, and the
limitations on agency ability to communicate reasons to generalist reviewers.
Our main claim is that administrative law should, and often does, recognize
that agencies have good second-order reasons for departing from first-order
rationality. Accordingly, so long as agencies act on the basis of reasons, in-
cluding second- or higher-order reasons, the thin conception of rationality
review is satisfied. We modulate this claim by examining similarities and
differences between different types of reviewers—most notably generalist
judges, on the one hand, and the reviewers of a different type (a mix of
economists and lawyers) who staff the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) on the other. Although some of our points apply to OIRA as
well as to the federal judiciary, some do not. In any event, OIRA is not
central for our project. Judicial review is our focus, and hard look review by
judges is our principal target.
Taken together, the descriptive and prescriptive sections offer a unified
account of rationality review. The caselaw and the theory march in tandem
to a surprising extent, although with notable exceptions and outliers. To
some substantial degree, judicial practice already embodies the thin ap-
proach to rationality review that theory recommends—an approach that is
far more flexible, accommodating, and intelligent about agency rationality
and its inescapable limitations than is the hard look approach.
22. Id. at 97 (alterations in original) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)).
23. Id. at 103.
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I. Description: The Real World of State Farm
A. State Farm and “State Farm”
A problem with our topic is that there are really two versions of State
Farm. One is the opinion itself, which is narrower than many commentators
have made it out to be. Another is the broader aura of the decision. Com-
mentators, generally suspicious of agency rationality, have puffed up State
Farm into a synecdoche for hard look review, contributing to a pervasive but
latent culture of academic skepticism towards agency explanations and
agency decisionmaking. Just as there are two versions of Marbury v.
Madison—the rather narrow decision itself, and the inflated and heavily
symbolic Marbury v. Madison that the Court so routinely invokes as a sym-
bol of judicial supremacy24—so too State Farm as doctrine coexists uneasily
with “State Farm” as symbol.
Our target is the latter, not the former. State Farm itself, we will argue, is
in important respects less demanding than the lawyers’ culture of hard look
suggests. The decision is clear, for example, that judges have no warrant to
require agencies to consider and discuss any policy alternative that the
judges happen to believe is relevant to the problem at hand.25 And we will
see that the Supreme Court has been careful, over time, about policing the
boundaries and maintaining the limits of State Farm. But the problem is that
lower courts and (especially) commentators have sometimes been less care-
ful. Overreading State Farm, they have applied it as though it demands a
kind of unbounded, ideal rationality from agencies, insensitive to the costs
of information and decisionmaking. Thin rationality review, by contrast,
emphasizes that agencies are constrained by limited resources, information,
and time, and asks what (nonideal) reasons agencies may have for acting
inaccurately, nonrationally, or arbitrarily in light of those limits.
While “State Farm” as symbol is not the law, there is nothing in State
Farm itself that is incompatible with our approach. Suppose judges applying
State Farm started to fold in all the second-order reasons and nonideal con-
straints we will discuss, and they started to say that even after a “hard look,”
agencies may act inaccurately, nonrationally, or arbitrarily, where agencies
have good reason to do so. Then we would have no quarrel with the result-
ing caselaw, but only because our normative claim—that good decisionmak-
ing allows for departures from first-order rationality where there is adequate
reason for such departures—would have been built into hard look review
itself. (In which case, of course, “hard look” would then be something of a
misnomer).
24. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014); Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427–28 (2012) (“At least since Marbury v. Madison . . . we have
recognized that when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ ” (cita-
tion omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))).
25. See infra text accompanying notes 75–76.
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B. Some Facts About the Law
What does the real world of arbitrary and capricious review look like,
and where do we look to find out? Our descriptive survey is impressionistic,
but suggestive. We begin with an overview of State Farm in the Supreme
Court and then turn to the courts of appeals. There is a distribution of cases
in both settings with important cases in the tails. Nevertheless, the outliers
should not be allowed to blur the overall picture. There are, of course, in-
stances of aggressive and intensive review under the arbitrary and capricious
framework; but in the Supreme Court at least, agencies almost always win. If
the task for appellate courts is to practice what the Supreme Court both
preaches and practices, the message is to apply a thin form of rationality
review. In the run of cases, arbitrary and capricious review entails a predict-
ably and sensibly deferential review of agency policy judgments.
1. The Supreme Court
Since the 1982–1983 Term, when State Farm was decided, the Court has
passed on the merits of arbitrariness challenges sixty-four times.26 The
agency lost on arbitrariness grounds in only five cases, and in three addi-
tional cases the agency lost on statutory and arbitrariness grounds.27 What
should we make of the fact that the Court deems agency decisions arbitrary
at most 13 percent of the time, and indeed only 8 percent of the time if we
confine ourselves to pure arbitrariness cases? Clearing the hard look hurdle
in the Supreme Court is hardly a heroic task.
To make headway on this question, consider first the hard cases for our
proposition: those in which the agency’s decision was struck down as arbi-
trary. To be sure, these cases are outliers, but like all exceptions, they are
important data points for understanding the rule. Two of these cases, Massa-
chusetts v. EPA28 and Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility
District No. 1,29 actually involve agency decisions not to act at all. Famously,
Massachusetts v. EPA overturned EPA’s decision not to decide whether
greenhouse gases constituted “pollution” pursuant to the Clean Air Act.30
But this was hardly a run-of-the-mill hard look case. While agency decisions
not to act—at least decisions not to engage in rulemaking—may be subject
to hard look review,31 in practice, agency failures to act tend to reach the
26. See infra Appendix.
27. See infra Appendix.
28. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
29. 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
30. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 534–35.
31. For an overview of the law bearing on review of agency “inaction,” see Cass R. Sun-
stein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 Geo. L.J.
157 (2014). Very roughly speaking, the Court says that (1) agency nonenforcement decisions
are presumptively unreviewable, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); (2) agency refusals to
engage in rulemaking are reviewable, although that review is “extremely limited” and “highly
deferential,” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527–28.
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Supreme Court in a posture of near-complete failure by the agency to carry
out its statutory obligations on a given issue.32 When the agency loses in
such cases, the Court is saying, in effect, that the agency must do something,
but that is a far cry from intensive hard look review of an ultimate agency
decision. When the agency has decided which of several policy options to
pursue, the Supreme Court almost never strikes down that judgment as ar-
bitrary. It is when the agency has said “we will do nothing” that the Su-
preme Court is willing to step in.
The Supreme Court case that most directly challenges our view is prob-
ably Judulang v. Holder.33 The case involved a challenge to the Board of Im-
migration Appeals’ (BIA) policy for deciding when resident aliens may apply
to the Attorney General for relief from deportation. Justice Kagan’s opinion
observed that “[w]hen an administrative agency sets policy, it must provide
a reasoned explanation for its action. That is not a high bar, but it is an
unwavering one.”34 The key language here is “not a high bar.” In concluding
that the BIA’s “comparable grounds” approach to determining immigration
status was entirely arbitrary, the Court explained that the decision rule must
bear some relationship to relevant statutory facts or factors.35 The Court ex-
plained that the agency’s policy turned on issues having nothing to do with
even arguably relevant facts: “Rather than considering factors that might be
thought germane to the deportation decision, that policy hinges § 212(c)
eligibility on an irrelevant comparison between statutory provisions.”36 As
important, the Court made clear that the factors that must be considered are
not limited to those expressly identified in the statute. Rather, the Court said
that legitimate factors for the agency to consider for arbitrariness review are
those “tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the immigration laws or the
appropriate operation of the immigration system.”37 The BIA lost in the case
because it lacked even this level of tangential support for its policy, but Judu-
lang v. Holder actually clarifies that agencies have more latitude to select
factors to explain or justify their decisions than has traditionally been
taught. It seems clear that this most recent instance of hard look review is
remarkably modest and far more consistent with Baltimore Gas than State
Farm itself. And more broadly, the few cases in which the agency loses
before the Court feature either refusals to act altogether, or the adoption of a
decision rule that is entirely unrelated to any statutorily relevant factor, and
in that sense genuinely capricious.
32. There is an exception to the presumption against nonreviewability of agency enforce-
ment decisions for cases in which the agency has entirely abdicated its enforcement responsi-
bility. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 31.
33. 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011).
34. Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 479.
35. See id. at 485.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 Admin. L.
Rev. 565, 615 (2014) (discussing this aspect of the decision).
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Our main point, however, is that the rare cases like Judulang v. Holder
must not be allowed to take up too much space in the collective memory of
the profession. To a first rough approximation, agencies almost always win
arbitrariness challenges in the Supreme Court.38 And to be clear, the distri-
bution of these cases is diverse. Six of the cases involve challenges to Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency actions, including enforcement orders, permit
decisions, and notice and comment rules.39 Two cases review Board of Im-
migration proceedings.40 Five cases review decisions of the Federal Commu-
nications Commission, both rate-setting, enforcement actions, and several
informal rulemakings: no action was held to be arbitrary and capricious.41
The agency represented most in the sample of Supreme Court challenges is
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which saw fourteen
challenges before the Court. In all but one, the agency’s action was upheld as
not arbitrary and capricious. The other cases involved a smorgasbord of
agencies, including the National Labor Relations Board (three enforcement
orders upheld as not arbitrary and capricious), the Department of the Inte-
rior, the Department of Commerce, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, and the Merit Systems Protection Board. The agencies at issue are quite
heterogeneous, and the cases include a mix of actions from informal
rulemaking, formal adjudication, enforcement actions, licensing and permit
decisions, to rate-setting, and so on. In case after case, no matter the agency
and no matter the action, the most likely outcome by an overwhelming mar-
gin is for the Court to uphold the action as not arbitrary and capricious.
Nor does there seem to be much partisan disagreement about the thinness of
review. The cases upholding agency action include majority opinions by Jus-
tices Scalia, Rehnquist, Roberts, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Thomas, White,
Breyer, Powell, Kennedy, Blackmun, Alito, Kagan, and O’Connor. In short,
all of the justices are well represented in the thin rationality review camp.
2. Courts of Appeals
In the courts of appeals, the record of arbitrary and capricious review is
more mixed. We consider both large-N empirical evidence and then an im-
pressionistic survey of some recent decisions. There are quite a few empirical
studies of judicial review of agency action—broadly defined—in the courts
of appeals, but few of arbitrary and capricious review specifically. Miles and
Sunstein remarked in 2008 at the “sparse empirical literature . . . on the
actual operation of the hard look doctrine,” noting additionally that “[t]here
38. See infra Appendix.
39. See infra Appendix.
40. See infra Appendix.
41. See infra Appendix.
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is no systematic evidence on the rate of invalidation under hard look re-
view.”42 In reviewing empirical studies across multiple judicial review doc-
trines, Richard J. Pierce, Jr. noted in 2011 that only Miles and Sunstein had
examined agency success rates in the courts of appeals under State Farm.43
Miles and Sunstein conclude that agencies win 64 percent of court of
appeals cases reviewing their decisions for arbitrariness.44 Their data set in-
cludes “all published appellate rulings from 1996 to 2006 involving review of
decisions of the EPA and review of NLRB decisions either for arbitrariness
or for lack of substantial evidence.”45 The authors sensibly limited their anal-
ysis to decisions reviewing those two agencies because the issues at stake
mapped easily onto political worldviews—the primary focus of the article.
But if one looks at the distribution of actual cases, just under 85 percent of
the cases they study are NLRB cases.46 The NLRB is an important agency,
but as students of administrative law will quickly recognize, the board makes
policy in a way that is almost unique in the universe of administrative agen-
cies, proceeding to formulate rules of general applicability through adjudica-
tion rather than rulemaking.47 Moreover, as the authors note, the NLRB’s
decisions—when it does anything at all—tend to be more consistently “lib-
eral” by traditional metrics, making them targets of whatever conservative
judicial politics might exist.48
Thus, the 64 percent figure is somewhat misleading. Judges voted to
overturn far more consequential EPA decisions on arbitrariness grounds in
barely more than one-fourth of the cases.49 EPA decisions are upheld against
arbitrariness challenges nearly 80 percent of the time.50 This is, of course, a
partial sample of the arbitrary and capricious universe—NLRB and EPA de-
cisions during 1996–2006—but there is little in the data to suggest that hard
look is being used as an elaborate or onerous form of review.
More recently, however, there have been several notable cases in which
courts of appeals have adopted a form of hard look review that is consistent
with neither the Supreme Court’s principles and practice, nor even with past
lower court approaches. In Business Roundtable v. SEC, the D.C. Circuit
struck down SEC rule 14a-11, which required “public companies to provide
42. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 761, 765 (2008).
43. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions
Mean?, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 77, 84 (2011).
44. Miles & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 767.
45. Id. at 766.
46. 653 cases were reviewed, with 554 from the NLRB and the remainder from the EPA.
See id. at 774.
47. E.g., Stephen G. Breyer et al., Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy
521–22 (7th ed. 2011).
48. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 777.
49. See id. at 778–79.
50. See id.
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shareholders with information about, and their ability to vote for, share-
holder-nominated candidates for the board of directors.”51 The court con-
cluded that the SEC’s Rule was arbitrary and capricious: “Because the agency
failed to ‘make tough choices about which of the competing estimates is
most plausible, [or] to hazard a guess as to which is correct,’ we believe it
neglected its statutory obligation to assess the economic consequences of its
rule.”52 So far, the reaction to Business Roundtable has been mixed, but the
modal response among administrative lawyers has been a mix of surprise
and dismay.53 Importantly, some have taken the case to stand for the pro-
position that an agency rule is arbitrary and capricious if it is not supported
by careful and rigorous cost-benefit analysis, including a detailed statement
of any potential costs or benefits that cannot be quantified and a clear state-
ment about how and why competing estimates of costs were resolved.54 So
interpreted, the case stands for an ambitious form of arbitrariness review
that requires cost-benefit analysis to the extent possible, unless statutorily
precluded.55
On this view, Business Roundtable constitutes an outlier approach to ar-
bitrariness review, in which the court required an elaborate showing of cost-
benefit analysis where possible. Shortly we will argue in general terms that
this approach neither is, nor should be, the law. As for the case, suffice it to
say that Business Roundtable illustrates the problems of hard look judicial
review, particularly with respect to economic market regulation. Many of
the potential effects, and therefore the costs and benefits, of the rule would
have been a function of a complex set of interdependent strategies and re-
plies by firms, investors, competitors, and so on—a form of strategic uncer-
tainty.56 Both the benefits and the costs of the rule, and others like it, are
uncertain precisely because it is difficult to predict with any precision how
markets will react.57 No doubt there are those who believe that this means
51. 647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
52. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1150 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (cit-
ing Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,  374 F.3d 1209, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
53. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882, 917–20, 917 n.116 (2015); James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C.
Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC
Rulemaking Authority, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1811, 1813 (2012); Jill E. Fisch, The Long Road Back:
Business Roundtable and the Future of SEC Rulemaking, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 695, 697–98
(2013); Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, The Bizarre Law and Economics of Business
Roundtable v. SEC, 38 J. Corp. L. 101, 102 (2012); Bruce Kraus & Connor Raso, Rational
Boundaries for SEC Cost-Benefit Analysis, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 289, 315–17 (2013); Cass R.
Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 393, 440–48
(2015).
54. Sunstein & Vermeule supra note 53, at 440–42.
55. For discussion and references, see id. at 437–48.
56. For distinctions among brute uncertainty, strategic uncertainty, and model uncer-
tainty in administrative policymaking, see Vermeule, supra note 9, at S9–S13.
57. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regula-
tion, 43 J. Legal Stud. S351 (2014).
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the SEC should have stayed its hand, but there is a good deal of space be-
tween that view and a conclusion that the SEC may not lawfully enact a rule
requiring notice about ways in which shareholders may nominate and elect
directors. We certainly have no view on the wisdom of Rule 14a-11. But in a
domain where the consequences of the rule are uncertain, the stakes high,
and the importance of specialized knowledge critical, there is no reason to
think that a three-judge panel knows better than the SEC. We will return to
these themes in the next Part.
All that said, let us keep the larger picture firmly in view. Unusual cases
tend to grip the mind. But Business Roundtable, and a set of other related or
similar cases,58 are outliers. The days of systematically aggressive hard look
review, as in the D.C. Circuit’s decisions from the 1970s and early 1980s, are
mostly behind us, thanks in part to the Supreme Court, which sat down
heavily on the D.C. Circuit in both Vermont Yankee59 and Baltimore Gas.60
And the Court recently overturned another procedural innovation from the
D.C. Circuit in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association.61
3. Problems
Judicial decisions are the result of a complex set of anticipated behaviors
by agencies and courts. If agencies believe that judicial review will be aggres-
sive, then strategic agencies may be more conservative in their policy
choices, adopting decisions that are well justified by the available evidence.
As a consequence, agencies would usually win in litigation, making it appear
that courts are applying a highly deferential standard. By the same token, if
agencies believe judicial review will be modest, they might be more aggres-
sive in their decisions, stretching policies just to the edge of justifiability and
beyond. If so, agencies might lose a lot in litigation, making it appear that
courts are adopting a stringent form of review. These are familiar dynamics
that travel under the rubric of selection effects.62
Selection effects are not a challenge to our prescriptive vision of arbi-
trariness review, but they are a potential problem for our descriptive ac-
count of arbitrariness review. To illustrate, we have claimed that agencies
virtually never lose on arbitrariness grounds in the Supreme Court, and that
agencies rarely lose on arbitrariness grounds in the courts of appeals. We
have interpreted that empirical regularity to suggest that the Supreme Court
is directing the lower courts to utilize a thinner form of rationality review,
one that requires merely that the agency’s decision not be pure caprice.
When the Supreme Court takes an arbitrariness case on review, it is almost
58. For the details, see Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 53, at 435–48.
59. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
60. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
61. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
62. See George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 1 (1984).
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always to support the agency’s decision. Selection effects, however, threaten
our interpretation, or at least throw a fly into the soup.
Suppose we are correct and the courts apply a form of thin rationality
review. If agencies recognize this, they might begin to relax the rigor with
which they justify their own decisionmaking. Courts, applying the same
standard of thin rationality review, would suddenly strike down more
agency actions, not because the court has adopted more aggressive review,
but because the agency has weakened its decisionmaking. Similarly, suppose
the courts are engaging in an ambitious thick form of rationality review.
Agencies, recognizing this practice, may begin to beef up their decisionmak-
ing process and justify their conclusions with more elaborate and careful
consideration. As a result, courts—again, applying the same thick form of
rationality review—would uphold many more agency decisions, making it
appear that there was a new easy bar to clear over which agencies virtually
never trip. Furthermore, when agencies lose in the courts of appeals, the
Solicitor General (SG) often acts as a gatekeeper whose consent agencies
must win in order to file a certiorari petition in the Supreme Court. If the
SG files petitions only when the agency’s case is strong, agencies might have
a better win-rate in the Supreme Court than in the lower courts, as indeed
they do. All these possibilities are intrinsically speculative. We cannot say
anything definitive about selection effects, nor can proponents of hard look
review. We can, however, be intellectually candid about the selection-effects
problem, a practice we hope will be embraced by others as well.
That said, there is some indirect evidence we can bring to bear. In what
is perhaps (we hope) the definitive word on empirical studies of agency win-
rates in litigation, David Zaring performed a meta-analysis of existing data
and also added new data on judicial review of agency fact-finding.63 Zaring
found that no matter what standard of review was utilized (hard look, Chev-
ron, or substantial evidence), and no matter what aspect of the decision was
reviewed (policy, law, or fact), agency win-rates were surprisingly stable.64
Almost uniformly, agencies won in litigation about 70 percent of the time.65
Neither the standard of review nor the aspect of the underlying decision
being challenged seemed to matter much at all. To be sure, selection effects
might be operating offstage in all these settings, including in the lower
courts, but at a certain point that abstract possibility ceases to impress. The
important point for our purposes is that no matter what linguistic formula-
tion courts invoke when engaging in rationality review, courts don’t seem to
be engaging in hard look analysis—or at least it requires major epicycles
about selection effects to save the hard look story. Agencies usually win, and
rather than requiring anything like a searching hard look inquiry, the result-
ing distribution of agency wins is far more consistent with a thin form of
rationality review.
63. See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 Va. L. Rev. 135 (2010).
64. See id. at 169.
65. Id.
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Another type of indirect evidence involves the putative problem of “os-
sification.” The myth of rigorous State Farm review has long been accompa-
nied by several mini-myths, part of the inherited generational wisdom about
the costs of intensive judicial review of agency policymaking. Chief among
these is the problem of agency ossification: consistent agency losses in litiga-
tion, coupled with fear of judicial review, resulted in agency paralysis. Infor-
mal rulemaking began taking years, if not decades; rulemaking records grew
exponentially as agencies were forced to address every possible concern, with
respect to every possible issue in every rulemaking, no matter how large or
small.66 The State Farm version of hard look review made it increasingly
difficult for agencies to do their jobs—or so we have been taught.
If true, agency ossification would be some empirical evidence in favor of
the strong version of State Farm review. Like rigorous State Farm review
itself, however, the ossification phenomenon is long on anecdote and short
on data. In fact, recent studies of agency rulemaking find virtually no evi-
dence of the ossification thesis. EPA rules go from start to finish in an aver-
age of a year and a half.67 In one exhaustive study of the unified regulatory
agenda, Anne O’Connell concludes that the “costs to rulemaking . . . are
certainly not so high as to prohibit considerable rulemaking activity.”68 And,
in another comprehensive survey of agency regulatory activity, Yackee and
Yackee conclude that agencies are able to promulgate large numbers of rules
fairly quickly.69
If there is little evidence of actual ossification, why has the idea of ossifi-
cation had so much influence? In part, it is because the few outlier examples
are high profile and therefore highly visible; but for that very reason, one
cannot accurately generalize from those cases to the remainder of the distri-
bution of rulemakings. We suspect, however, that there is a simpler explana-
tion as well. If one believes that State Farm entails searching hard look
review, then it simply stands to reason, as a matter of nearly inimitable logic,
that ossification will result. Once that misguided assumption is relaxed, the
fact that there is little evidence of ossification makes perfect sense. Arbitrari-
ness review is like a legal phantom: it can scare, but rarely hurts. So long as
agencies comply with some minimal rationality requirements, they usually
win in litigation.
The possibility of strong selection effects complicates our descriptive
claim about agencies’ overwhelming win-loss record in the Supreme Court
66. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
Duke L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemak-
ing, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59, 60–62 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Re-
thinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75
Tex. L. Rev. 483, 483 n.1 (1997).
67. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA
Rulemaking from 2001–2005, 38 Envtl. L. 767, 784 (2008).
68. Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 Va. L. Rev. 889, 932 (2008).
69. Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic
Performance: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”?, 20 J. Pub. Admin. Res. & Theory 261 (2009).
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and, a fortiori, their impressive—but not overwhelming—win-loss record in
the courts of appeals. However, the selection effects hypothesis is specula-
tive, and there is indirect evidence that it is at most a weak force—evidence
both from Zaring’s global comparison of standards of review and from the
ossification studies. And let us be clear that what the Court says is even more
important than the win-loss record. As we will detail in the next Part, the
Court’s approach to rationality review is thin in precisely our sense. Justices
of all types—unlike some lower court judges—show a deep appreciation for
the constraints under which agencies act, high tolerance for agency action
under uncertainty, and a willingness to allow agencies to adopt strategies of
second-order rationality that permit inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary
action in particular cases.
II. Prescription: Thin Rationality Review
What if anything might justify the pattern of deferential rationality re-
view we have observed in Part I? There is a theory implicit, and sometimes
explicit, in the bulk of the Court’s caselaw: thin rationality review. In this
Part, we lay out the theory in both negative and positive terms, and examine
its institutional implications for judicial review of agency action. We will
also examine some indirect implications for nonjudicial review of agency
action, OIRA review being the main example.
We begin, in Section II.A, with a series of negative claims. There are
many things that rationality review does not require, and that the Court has
generally disavowed, despite contrary assumptions or arguments scattered
through the lower court caselaw and especially the commentary. Judges may
not require agencies to conduct quantified cost-benefit analysis, even pre-
sumptively; may not always require agencies to conduct comparative policy
evaluation, obliging agencies to show that the chosen policy is superior to
feasible alternatives, or superior to the agency’s own past choices; may not
require agencies to have valid first-order reasons for all their choices; may
not force agencies to opt for “conservative” assumptions in the face of un-
certainty; need not require a “rational connection between the facts found
and the choices made,”70 depending upon how exactly that critical idea is
understood; need not require agencies to be able to explain or convey their
reasons, to the satisfaction of a panel of generalist judges; and may not lard
rationality review with quasi-procedural obligations.
In Section II.B, we offer a simple positive formulation of rationality re-
view that attempts to capture the thin conception. We hold that agencies
must act based on reasons, but also that (1) agencies may have reasons they
cannot give, at least at acceptable cost; and (2) the set of admissible reasons
includes second-order reasons to act inaccurately, nonrationally, or arbitrar-
ily. That formulation seems paradoxical; we will attempt to explain that the
paradox is illusory.
70. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168) (1962)).
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Finally, in Section II.C, we will consider whether and how our thin con-
ception of rationality review applies, not only to judicial review, but to re-
view by OIRA or other executive branch institutions. Some, but not all, of
our negative prescriptions hold, mutatis mutandis—most controversially,
our suggestions that reviewers have no basis in the theory of rational deci-
sionmaking for requiring agencies to conduct quantified cost-benefit analy-
sis (although there may be other grounds for doing so), and that agencies
may have good reasons that they may be unable to communicate to the
reviewer. Most generally, our claim that agencies may have good second-
order reasons to act in ways that are inaccurate, nonrational, or arbitrary
holds, regardless of the nature of the reviewing body.
A. Negative Prescriptions
1. “Relevant Factors”
To clear some ground, we will briefly mention a recurring confusion
that stems not from State Farm, but from the original framework for ration-
ality review laid down in Overton Park. Chief among the latter’s innovations
was the idea that agencies must consider “the relevant factors,” and also
avoid “clear error[s] of judgment.”71 The injunction to consider the “rele-
vant factors” has fostered nontrivial confusion, because the source of those
factors is not obvious. Is Overton Park saying, for example, that judges
should identify policy factors in the problem at issue, policy factors that
seem relevant to them, and then require agencies to consider those factors?
Not at all; indeed, the Court has specifically repudiated that procedure
both in State Farm itself72 and in subsequent cases.73 Understood in the
larger framework of judicial review of agency action, the function of the
“relevant factors” inquiry is simply to ensure that the agency has given due
consideration to any factors made relevant by the authorizing statute itself,
and to ensure that the agency has not considered any factors the statute rules
off-limits. Absent constitutional problems, Congress enjoys the power to set
the agency’s deliberative agenda by statute, either in positive or negative
terms, and the “relevant factors” inquiry ensures that agencies respect Con-
gress’s choices.
71. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
72. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51 (“Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all
policy alternatives in reaching decision. It is true that rulemaking ‘cannot be found wanting
simply because the agency failed to include every alternative device and thought conceivable by
the mind of man . . . regardless of how uncommon or unknown that alternative may have
been . . . .’ But the airbag is more than a policy alternative to the passive restraint Standard; it
is a technological alternative within the ambit of the existing Standard.”) (alterations in origi-
nal) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 551
(1978)).
73. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 646 (1990) (“If agency
action may be disturbed whenever a reviewing court is able to point to an arguably relevant
statutory policy that was not explicitly considered, then a very large number of agency deci-
sions might be open to judicial invalidation.”).
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Given that the relevant factors inquiry is really one of statutory interpre-
tation, it is subject to the rules of statutory interpretation that always govern
in administrative law. One of those is the Chevron doctrine, under which
agencies, rather than courts, enjoy the authority to fill in statutory gaps and
ambiguities. The Court has made it plain that Chevron applies to the inter-
pretive question about what factors the statute makes relevant.74 And, three
terms ago, the Court also explained that Chevron applies to agency interpre-
tations of their own jurisdiction as well.75 In particular, where statutes are
silent or ambiguous, agencies—rather than courts—enjoy discretion to de-
cide what the relevant factors may be and whether to consider those
factors.76
Agencies also enjoy discretion to decide when to consider those factors.
The Court has also been clear that agencies need not consider all logically
relevant policy factors at once, but may instead parcel them out into differ-
ent proceedings, considering problems by parts and proceeding one step at a
time.77 Relatedly, agencies may in adjudication single out one or a few de-
fendants from the mass of similarly situated firms, in order to create a test
case, or to examine the relevant questions case by case—even if from the
defendant’s point of view, the selection is entirely arbitrary.78
This relaxed approach makes eminent sense. The precondition for Chev-
ron to apply is a “step zero” analysis, which asks whether Congress has dele-
gated law-interpreting authority to agencies rather than courts.79 The
74. See id. at 647–52.
75. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
76. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984).
77. See Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211,
230–31 (1991) (“An agency enjoys broad discretion in determining how best to handle related,
yet discrete, issues in terms of procedures and priorities. . . . [A]n agency need not solve every
problem before it in the same proceeding. This applies even where the initial solution to one
problem had adverse consequences for another area that the agency was addressing.” (citations
omitted)). There is some tension between this principle and the Court’s recent holding in
Michigan v. EPA, that an agency instructed to consider all “appropriate and necessary” factors
must consider costs and benefits at every stage of the proceedings. See 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2709
(2015); cf. id. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Agency acted well within its authority in
declining to consider costs at the opening bell of the regulatory process given that it would do
so in every round thereafter . . . .”). As we discuss later, however, Michigan v. EPA is best
understood to stand for the narrow, indisputable, and indeed nearly tautological proposition
that at every stage of the administrative process, an agency decisionmaker must always con-
sider both the pros and cons of whatever course of action the decisionmaker undertakes; it
cannot look only to one side of the ledger. See infra text accompanying notes 137–146. So
read, Michigan v. EPA is entirely compatible with Mobil Oil and with thin rationality review
generally. After all, although the agency must consider the pros and cons of every decision it
makes, it still enjoys “broad discretion” over timing and resource allocation, and “need not
solve every problem before it in the same proceeding.” See Mobil Oil, 498 U.S. at 230–31.
78. “[W]hether all firms in the industry should be dealt with in a single proceeding or
should receive individualized treatment are questions that call for discretionary determination
by the administrative agency.” Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411, 413–14 (1958) (al-
lowing the FTC to cull one firm from the herd).
79. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833,
873–89 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 207–19 (2006).
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animating objectives of Chevron—political accountability and expertise—
both suggest that Congress’s default intention is that agencies, rather than
courts, should determine which policy factors count as “relevant,” and
which factors should be considered in which proceeding, absent clear statu-
tory indication to the contrary or some special reason to think that the ques-
tion is so important that it is not fit for agency resolution.80 As to any
reasonably complex policy problem, an indefinitely large number of policy
factors are potentially relevant, or can be claimed to be relevant by litigants
who benefit from delaying agency action. Generalist judges who attempt to
sift the wheat from the chaff will run every risk of becoming confused, ab-
sent explicit statutory guidance, and will inevitably end up making de facto
policy choices that should lie within the province of relatively more respon-
sive and better-informed agencies.
So an agency that otherwise enjoys delegated interpretive authority
under Chevron “step zero” also enjoys the authority to decide which factors
count as “relevant” for purposes of Overton Park—provided, of course, that
the underlying statute is silent or ambiguous. Where statutes are clear, how-
ever, either mandating or prohibiting consideration of relevant factors,
courts must enforce their terms. In other words, the ordinary Chevron in-
quiry governs. For our purposes, the important point is that rationality re-
view neither requires, nor even permits, generalist judges to decide on their
own initiative that a given factor that happens to strike them as important is
a legally “relevant factor” under Overton Park. Absent clear statutory in-
struction or an issue of extraordinary political and economic significance,
policy relevance is a matter for agency determination.
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis—Quantified and Otherwise
With the advent of Business Roundtable, some have begun to suggest that
cost-benefit analysis is a necessary component of rational decisionmaking,
so that a requirement of cost-benefit analysis should be read into arbitrary
and capricious review.81 How can a decision be rational if it is unjustified by
80. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. and King v. Burwell both say that Chevron
deference does not apply to questions of great “economic and political significance.” King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 159–60 (2000).
81. Sunstein’s separate section in Libertarian Administrative Law—with which Vermeule
emphatically disagrees, see Sunstein & Vermeule supra note 53, at 443–46— seemingly en-
dorses the following propositions:
To the extent that available evidence permits quantification, it would be arbitrary not to
quantify. . . . To the extent that Business Roundtable stands for this general principle, it is
on firm ground. . . .  Indeed, it would generally seem arbitrary for an agency to issue a
rule that has net costs (or no net benefits), at least unless a statute requires it to do so.
Id. at 441. For further discussion, see also Justice Scalia’s statement at oral argument in Michi-
gan v. EPA:
I’m not even sure I agree with the premise that when . . . Congress says nothing about
cost, the agency is entitled to disregard cost. I would think it’s classic arbitrary and capri-
cious agency action for an agency to command something that is outrageously expensive
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the attendant costs and benefits?82 Legally, there are two related-but-distinct
ideas. As to the interpretation of agency organic statutes, one view holds that
congressional silence or ambiguity should be read to require cost-benefit
analysis, quantified where possible.83 In a related view, unless statutes clearly
prohibit the consideration of costs, arbitrariness review should be under-
stood to require that agencies supply quantified cost-benefit analysis, wher-
ever quantification is possible.84
In our view, however, these claims hover between confused and mis-
taken. There is a thin tautological sense in which rationality requires that
decisionmakers do what is better, as opposed to what is worse. But rational-
ity certainly does not require quantified cost-benefit analysis in the technical
sense. As for the interpretation of organic statutes and of arbitrariness re-
view under the APA, there is no plausible basis for even a presumptive re-
quirement of quantified cost-benefit analysis.
a. Conceptual Problems
At the conceptual level, there is slippage in this literature between a tau-
tology on the one hand, and a highly sectarian decision-procedure on the
other.85 The tautology is that a decisionmaker should do what is best, all
things considered. In that sense, it may always be said, without possibility of
and . . . in which the expense vastly exceeds whatever public benefit can be . . . achieved. I
would think that’s . . . a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (No. 14-46). The
actual decision in Michigan v. EPA did not go nearly that far, however. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 137–148.
82. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environ-
ment 6, 99–132 (2002), and Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. Legal
Stud. 1059 (2000) (advocating cost-benefit analysis as a corrective to cognitive problems and
judgment errors), with Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 139 (2004),
Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Pragmatic
Reorientation, 32 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 433, 446–50 (2008) (describing adoption of cost-
benefit analysis as part of a “ ‘comprehensive rationality’ that rational choice theorists consider
essential to rational decisionmaking”), and Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, 29 J. Legal Stud. 931, 935 (2000) (“At the risk of oversimplification, explicit valuation is a
part of the insistence on a rationalist approach, which demands full explication of the reasons
for taking a decision, rather than relying on an unreasoned conviction or on an implicitly
derived conclusion.”).
83. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State: The Future of Regulatory Pro-
tection 59–60 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State]; Cass R. Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1651, 1691–94 (2001) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Default Principles].
84. See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, supra note 83, at 1686.
85. For the view that quantified cost-benefit analysis is best understood as a decision-
procedure, see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale
L.J. 165, 167 (1999). For the view that it is a sectarian decision-procedure, see id. (“Many law
professors, economists, and philosophers believe that CBA does not produce morally relevant
information and should not be used in project evaluation.”).
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contradiction, that the decisionmaker should ensure that the “benefits” ex-
ceed the “costs.” Were a decisionmaker to say that “the benefits are X; the
costs are Y; we find that Y > X; nonetheless we choose to do X,” one would
either doubt the decisionmaker’s rationality or assume some misunder-
standing or miscommunication.86 (As we will see, however, this sort of ex-
ample assumes certainty, or at least well-formed probability assessments, as
to the costs and benefits. Under conditions of genuine uncertainty, perhaps
arising from high costs of information, rationality even permits decision-
procedures that do not attempt to figure out, in a first-order way, whether
benefits exceed costs.)
Thus an informal and nonquantified sense of cost-benefit analysis—
thinking about the “pros” and “cons”87—is ubiquitous, both in law and life.
Charles Darwin famously drew up a list of pros and cons in deciding
whether to marry.88 But this informal sense of cost-benefit analysis is not
what is at stake in the legal debates. In Business Roundtable, the SEC offered
a detailed qualitative discussion of the pros and cons of its rule.89 The court
nonetheless objected that the agency’s cost-benefit analysis was inadequate
because the agency had not tried hard enough to quantify some of the rele-
vant factors.90
As Business Roundtable illustrates, proponents urge a particular, highly
structured decision-procedure: quantified CBA.91 That procedure is techni-
cal, but it is also highly controversial, even polarizing, especially in its purest
form, which is not only quantified but monetized. Proponents praise it as a
mechanism for welfare-maximization, for promoting democratic trans-
parency in agency decisionmaking, or for securing presidential control of
agencies.92 Opponents criticize it for reducing incommensurables to a com-
mon denominator, for smuggling in controversial value judgments and hid-
den margins of discretion, and for crowding out nonquantifiable
considerations.93
86. See Sen, supra note 82, at 934.
87. See generally Sen, supra note 82 (describing a “general social choice approach” to
cost-benefit analysis). For a clear-minded treatment of the distinctions among intuitive judg-
ment, unquantified cost-benefit analysis and quantified cost-benefit analysis, see Coates, supra
note 53, at 892–93.
88. 2 The Correspondence of Charles Darwin 1837–1843 444 (Frederick Burkhardt
et al. eds., 1986). Cases like Darwin’s list actually suggest that some decisions ought not to be
made even on the basis of informal cost-benefit analysis, although we need not establish that
proposition here.
89. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668, 56,753–71
(Sept. 16, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 232, 240, and 249).
90. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
91. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, New Foundations of Cost-Bene-
fit Analysis 100 (2006).
92. See, e.g., id.; Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking Rationality:
How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect the Environment and Our Health
12–13 (2008); Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State, supra note 83, at 6–10.
93. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the
Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing 7–12 (2004); Thomas O. McGarity,
1376 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1355
The problems and promise of quantified CBA have been rehashed many
times, and we do not address its merits here. But quantified CBA is a spe-
cialized, sectarian decision-procedure, not a requirement of rational deci-
sionmaking. Many demonstrably rational economists, philosophers, lawyers
and other students of decisionmaking do not believe that rationality requires
quantified CBA. Some believe, on the contrary, that best practices of deci-
sionmaking actually forbid resort to quantified CBA, because it has no moral
relevance whatsoever and sometimes misleads.94 More temperately, others
believe that quantified CBA is sometimes useful, sometimes not, but reject
the idea that it is inscribed in the very nature of rationality.95 Quantified
CBA is both disputable and widely disputed. To impose it on agencies in the
name of rationality would be to squelch reasonable disagreement by sheer
force.
b. Legal Problems
The legal issue is whether judges may require agencies to use quantified
CBA, at least presumptively, either as a matter of arbitrariness review under
the APA, or else by interpretation of agencies’ organic statutes.96 We argue
that judges have no warrant for so requiring. The Court has emphatically
banned judges from imposing decision-procedures on agencies as a matter
of federal common law, and there is no source of positive law that might be
read to impose a global, judicially enforceable mandate of quantified CBA
on agencies, even presumptively. (Later we will take up the very different
issue of quantified CBA mandates during executive review; such mandates
by their terms are not enforceable in court.)97
Quantified CBA is a particular decision-procedure—emphasis on proce-
dure. Under Vermont Yankee98 and Perez,99 agencies have discretion about
whether to adopt such procedures, and courts have no power to force them
Reinventing Rationality: The Role of Regulatory Analysis in the Federal Bureau-
cracy 142–59 (2005); Coates, supra note 53; Amy Sinden et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis: New
Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 Reg. & Governance 48, 55–56 (2009).
94. See Adler & Posner, supra note 85, at 171–72 (discussing objections).
95. See id.
96. Confusingly, in recent years, some of the academic commentary has concluded that
Chevron (or at least Chevron Step Two) and arbitrariness review are actually equivalent. If an
agency has adopted a view that is an unreasonable interpretation of its organic statute, that
view must also be arbitrary and capricious; if an agency view is arbitrary and capricious then it
cannot be a reasonable interpretation of the statute. See, e.g., Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualiz-
ing Chevron and Discretion: A Comment on Levin and Rubin, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1377,
1377–79 (1997); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 1253, 1276 (1997); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law &
Policy, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 821, 827–28 (1990). For our purposes, this debate is something
of a sideshow. We simply note it because the language of cases and commentary is often
imprecise, slipping back and forth between doctrinal frameworks for this reason.
97. See infra text accompanying note 217.
98. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
99. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015).
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to do so, beyond the procedures prescribed by the APA itself. Suppose that
an agency is charged with deciding whether to regulate mercury emissions
from electric utilities,100 and suppose also that the court tells the agency
that—even after the agency has considered the relevant statutory factors—
the agency must, if possible, quantify and monetize the various factors.
What the court has done is to prescribe how, and by what procedures, the
agency is to exercise its discretion. That is the very thing the Court has
“[t]ime and again . . . reiterated” that lower courts are forbidden to do.101
The only way around the Vermont Yankee problem is to locate the man-
date for cost-benefit analysis either in organic statutes or in section 706 it-
self, but neither approach succeeds. Where agency organic statutes are silent
or ambiguous, it is wildly implausible that Congress intends (or could be
deemed fictionally to intend) a global default rule requiring cost-benefit
analysis. Across the broad landscape of federal regulatory statutes, Congress
sometimes mandates quantified CBA, sometimes refers vaguely to consider-
ations of “cost,” sometimes leaves matters ambiguous, sometimes contents
itself with Delphic silence, sometimes explicitly forbids consideration of cost,
and sometimes mandates other decision-procedures altogether, such as “fea-
sibility” analysis.102 There is no legal basis to elevate one of these approaches
to global default-rule status, apart from a sectarian preference for one ap-
proach or the other. The regulatory system writ large, like the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, is a series of “compromises” that allows “opposing social
and political forces” to “come to rest.”103 There is irreducible reasonable dis-
agreement about the best regulatory decision-procedure, including the very
plausible view that there is no single best decision-procedure, independent
of context.
The same statutory landscape militates strongly against reading a (pre-
sumptive) requirement of quantified CBA into the “arbitrary and capri-
cious” language of section 706(2)(A). To do so implies that Congress itself
acts irrationally whenever it mandates feasibility analysis, or forbids cost
considerations, as it sometimes does. Are the proponents prepared to invali-
date as irrational all statutes that mandate feasibility, or forbid considera-
tions of cost, perhaps under the Due Process Clause? Invalidate the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, perhaps?104 (It is no answer to say that
the standard of rationality review is more deferential for Congress, although
100. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708 (2015).
101. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1207. Michigan v. EPA clearly declined to impose any such re-
quirement. 135 S. Ct. at 2711.
102. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 657, 658 (2010) (collecting examples). Masur and Posner criticize feasibility but do not
claim that Congress should be taken to intend to require that agencies perform quantified
CBA whenever statutes are silent or ambiguous. Id. at 662–63, 687–712.
103. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950).
104. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA Unconstitutional?, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1407 (2008). Sunstein
criticizes OSHA on nondelegation grounds but is also sharply critical of feasibility analysis.
The logic of his view is that the Act is patently irrational and therefore vulnerable to a due
process challenge.
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that is true.105 The view at issue is that not doing quantified CBA, when that
is possible, is no more rational than using a Ouija board—unconstitutional
under any standard.) Whatever the answer to those questions, such provi-
sions show that many presumptively reasonable legislators, at various times,
have not thought it irrational to mandate decision-procedures other than
quantified CBA. The proponents’ reading of 706(2)(A) would thus produce
an immediate and severe incoherence in the federal regulatory system
overall.
c. Current Law
So there is no basis for either a global default rule requiring quantified
CBA whenever statutes are silent or ambiguous, or else for reading an obli-
gation to perform quantified CBA into the arbitrariness standard of
706(2)(A). Fortunately, current law emphatically rejects both ideas in any
event. The Supreme Court has consistently held that quantified CBA is dis-
cretionary for agencies.106 There are a few exceptions that are memorable
precisely because they diverge from the normal course of judicial practice.
But a brace of recent cases has clarified the terrain.
In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,107 the Court upheld EPA’s use of
cost-benefit analysis in the face of statutory silence with respect to standards
in section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act. The Second Circuit had held that
the EPA was not permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in determining the
content of regulations under section 316(b).108 At issue in the case were EPA
regulations concerning the technology required for operators of large power
plants that utilize “cooling water intake structures,” drawing water in from
water sources to cool the plant, in the process killing aquatic life. The Clean
Water Act requires that
[a]ny standard . . . applicable to a point source shall require that the loca-
tion, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures
reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact.109
So-called closed-cycle cooling systems recirculate the water used to cool the
facility and therefore extract less water from the local water source and gen-
erate less risk of harm to aquatic life. The EPA’s rule required new sources to
105. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9
(1983) (“We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legisla-
tion drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its
statutory mandate.”).
106. See Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein’s Cost-Benefit Lite: Economics for Liberals, 29 Colum.
J. Envtl. L. 191, 240 (2004); cf. Thomas O. McGarity, Professor Sunstein’s Fuzzy Math, 90 Geo.
L. J. 2341, 2343 (2002).
107. 556 U.S. 208 (2009).
108. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2007).
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
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use technology approximating the performance of closed-cycle cooling sys-
tem. For certain classes of existing sources, however, the EPA required re-
ductions in the harm to aquatic organisms, but nowhere near the reduction
that would be accomplished if the EPA mandated performance at the closed-
cycle cooling system level.110 While the closed-cycle cooling system perform-
ance would reduce impingement and entrainment mortality by up to 98
percent, the costs of compliance for these existing sources would be nine
times greater ($3.5 billion) than reducing aquatic damage by 80–95  percent
using the alternative performance standards.111 Put informally, the EPA con-
cluded that the marginal costs of achieving the best possible reduction in
aquatic harm drastically outweighed the corresponding marginal benefit.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the EPA could
permissibly read “best” to simply mean “most advantageous.”112 One possi-
ble interpretation of “best” is the technology that achieves the greatest re-
duction in adverse environmental impact.113 Another, however, is the
technology that “most efficiently produces some good.”114 The Court quickly
dispensed with the notion that statutory silence necessarily precludes or
mandates cost-benefit analysis. On the contrary, discussing several cases in
which statutory silence was read to preclude cost-benefit analysis,115 or at
least to not require it,116 the Court explained that “under Chevron, that an
agency is not required to do [cost-benefit analysis] does not mean that an
agency is not permitted to do so.”117 Even though other standards in the
CWA might preclude cost-benefit analysis in express terms, the EPA was free
to adopt a reasonable interpretation of the statutory standard above as al-
lowing cost-benefit analysis. Far from announcing a default rule in favor of
cost-benefit analysis, the Court made clear that statutory ambiguity will gen-
erally be read to give agencies discretion with respect to whether or not to
utilize it.
Environmental Protection Agency v. EME Homer City Generation L.P.118 is
similar. The case involved a challenge to the EPA’s interstate air pollution
rules governing the conduct of upwind states that contribute significantly to
air pollution in downstream states. The Clean Air Act requires States to
110. Entergy, 556 U.S. at 215–16; National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Final
Regulations to Establish Requirements for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II Existing
Facilities, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,576, 41,599–606 (July 9, 2004) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 23.2).
111. Entergy, 556 U.S. at 216.
112. Id. at 218.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 223 (discussing Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457
(2001)).
116. Id. (discussing Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981)).
117. Id.
118. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
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eliminate “amounts” of pollution that “contribute significantly to nonattain-
ment” in downwind states.119 But because multiple states may affect condi-
tions in a downstream state, the statute requires the EPA to apportion
reductions. The D.C. Circuit had held that the statute required EPA to allo-
cate responsibility for reducing emissions proportionally to each State’s
physical contribution.120 The EPA’s method of determining cost-reduction
obligations balanced the magnitude of the state’s contribution to the pollu-
tion of downstream air conditions and the costs associated with reducing
them.121 The challengers argued that the EPA was forbidden to consider
costs, but, as in Entergy, the majority again clarified that unless the statute
clearly mandates otherwise, the EPA is free to consider costs. “The Agency
has chosen, sensibly in our view, to reduce the amount easier, i.e., less costly,
to eradicate, and nothing in the text of the Good Neighbor Provision pre-
cludes that choice.”122 In short, in the face of statutory silence, the agency is
free to use cost-benefit analysis or not, as it sees fit.
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA123 (“UARG”) the Court consid-
ered a challenge to the EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act as it per-
tains to greenhouse gases (GHGs). In Massachusetts v. EPA,124 the Court had
held that greenhouse gas emissions were “pollutants” for at least some pur-
poses of the Clean Air Act. After Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency issued
greenhouse gas emission standards for new motor vehicles.125 Stationary
sources are governed by two separate provisions of the Clean Air Act (as
relevant here)—the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provi-
sions126 and the Title V permitting program.127 Those provisions set numeri-
cal triggers for what sort of entity is regulated (100 or 250 tons per year of a
pollutant).128 Because greenhouse gases, unlike other air pollutants, are emit-
ted in vastly greater amounts, those numerical thresholds would have
119. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i) (2012).
120. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d,
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014).
121. See Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208, 48,254 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72 et al.); see also EME Homer City, 134 S. Ct. at 1597.
122. EME Homer City, 132 S. Ct. at 1607.
123. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 (2014).
124. 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007).
125. See UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2436–37.
126. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7471–7492 (2012).
127. Id. § 7661.
128. See id. §§ 7479(1), 7661(2)(B), 7602(j).
June 2016] Thin Rationality Review 1381
brought thousands of new small entities under the rubric of the EPA permit-
ting process.129 Accordingly, the EPA sought to cover initially only those en-
tities emitting more than 100,000 tons of greenhouse gases per year.130 In
short, the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA prodded the agency to adopt an
ambitious reading of the statute, which then threatened to render part of the
existing regulatory framework unworkable.
Without delving too deeply into the technical details of the Clean Air
Act, there were essentially two types of sources at issue in the EPA rule chal-
lenged in UARG. The first group would not have been subject to the PSD or
Title V permitting process at all, but for their greenhouse gas emissions. The
Court held that the EPA’s interpretation, which brought these thousands of
sources into the Act’s coverage, was unlawful.131 The second group of
sources were subject to the permitting process for the emission of other air
pollutants anyway. For this group of sources, there was a subsequent inter-
pretive question about whether the EPA’s decision to require Best Available
Control Technology (BACT) for greenhouse gases was a permissible inter-
pretation of the statute. The Court held that it was.132 The challengers essen-
tially argued that BACT does not work for greenhouse gases.133 The Court’s
discretion-preserving language is striking: “applying BACT to greenhouse
gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dra-
matic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s interpreta-
tion is unreasonable.”134
Because UARG strikes down an EPA interpretation, it might at first
glance be read as an aggressive form of judicial review in tension with En-
tergy and EME Homer. In reality, however, it is precisely the opposite. EPA
had advanced a view that the agency was required to adopt the same defini-
tion of “air pollutant” throughout the Clean Air Act, and therefore GHGs
needed to be treated as criteria pollutants. As Justice Scalia explained, how-
ever, “the presumption of consistent usage readily yields to context, and a
statutory term—even one defined in the statute—may take on distinct char-
acters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different
implementation strategies.”135 Because the EPA’s rigid interpretation would
render the statutory scheme unworkable, it was not a permissible interpreta-
tion of the statute. But where the interpretation would not render the
scheme unworkable (for “anyway” sources), EPA was free to adopt either
interpretation. Indeed, this latter part of the opinion is striking for just how
129. See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg.
44,354, 44,498–99 (proposed July 30, 2008); see also UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2436.
130. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,523–24 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50–52, et
al.).
131. UARG, 134 S. Ct. at 2443–46.
132. Id. at 2447–49.
133. Id. at 2447.
134. Id. at 2448.
135. Id. at 2441 (quoting Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 574 (2007)).
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far removed from mandatory cost-benefit analysis it is. The agency was not
required to pick a rule that was even close to cost-benefit justified so long as
it was “not so disastrously unworkable.”136
Finally, there is the recent decision in Michigan v. EPA,137 in which the
Court invalidated an EPA rule under the Clean Air Act relating to hazardous
emissions from power plants. The relevant statutory text authorized regula-
tion only if “appropriate and necessary.”138 As framed by the litigation, the
question was whether the EPA could defer consideration of costs at the stage
of deciding whether to regulate, and later take costs into account at the stage
of deciding how much to regulate—how stringent regulation should be.139 In
an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that under the statutory text,
cost was a “relevant factor,” and the EPA’s decision to ignore cost at the first
decisional stage was unreasonable.140 The decision is most easily and natu-
rally read as a Chevron Step Two decision, on a straightforward statutory
issue under the particular scheme of the relevant Clean Air Act provisions.141
Proponents of quantified cost-benefit analysis point to seemingly broad
language in the opinion,142 as when the majority opined that “[o]ne would
not say that it is even rational, never mind ‘appropriate,’ to impose billions
of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environ-
mental benefits.”143 On the broadest possible reading, this could mean that it
is arbitrary and capricious for agencies not to conduct quantified and mone-
tized cost-benefit analysis where possible. Yet this is an interpretation the
Court took pains to disavow later in the opinion. Justice Scalia went out of
his way to emphasize that while rationality may require “paying attention to
the advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions,”144 that is not the
same as requiring quantification of the advantages and disadvantages:
The Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost of
compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate and neces-
sary. We need not and do not hold that the law unambiguously required
the Agency, when making this preliminary estimate, to conduct a formal
cost-benefit analysis in which each advantage and disadvantage is assigned
136. Id. at 2448.
137. 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
138. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).
139. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706–09.
140. Id. at 2711–12.
141. Or straightforward for those who believe that Chevron has two steps. But see Mat-
thew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 Va. L. Rev. 597
(2009).
142. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Thanks, Justice Scalia, for the Cost-Benefit State, Bloomberg
View (July 7, 2015), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-07-07/thanks-justice-
scalia-for-the-cost-benefit-state [http://perma.cc/8ENH-NJWP] (calling the opinion in Michi-
gan v. EPA a “ringing endorsement of cost-benefit analysis by government agencies”).
143. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2707.
144. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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a monetary value. It will be up to the Agency to decide (as always, within
the limits of reasonable interpretation) how to account for cost.145
Decisions about quantification, in other words, are a matter for reasonable
agency discretion, contra Business Roundtable. Michigan v. EPA is clearly
alert to the distinction between the colloquial, informal sense of “costs and
benefits,” on the one hand, and formalized quantified and monetized cost-
benefit analysis on the other. The decision is principally an interpretive
holding, about the meaning of the phrase “appropriate and necessary” in a
particular section of the Clean Air Act. But insofar as it addresses issues of
rationality review in passing, it stands only for the unobjectionable proposi-
tion that rationality requires consideration of both the “advantages and the
disadvantages of agency decisions.”146 Absent specific statutory instruction,
agencies may not conduct a one-sided assessment of either costs or benefits
without the other, any more than they may consider only one side’s factual
evidence. The case stands for nothing broader than that unexceptional
proposition.
d. “State Farm with Teeth”
Finally, there is an emergent idea in the commentary that tries to link a
more intensive version of arbitrariness review with the performance of cost-
benefit analysis by agencies. Professor Catherine Sharkey’s proposed “State
Farm with Teeth” argues for a more intensive elevated standard for judicial
review of some independent agency decisions, particularly cost-benefit anal-
ysis not reviewed by OIRA.147 The core idea is that courts should review
agency decisions backed by high-quality cost-benefit analysis less intensively
than they otherwise would. Judicial practice along these lines would not ex-
pressly require cost-benefit analysis, but would do so indirectly.
To the extent that there is an implicit claim in Sharkey’s proposal that
courts should adopt a thin version of rationality review for agency decisions
145. Id. at 2711; accord id. at 2717 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“As the Court notes, [account-
ing for costs] does not require an agency to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis of every
administrative action.”).
146. Id. at 2707. This is not to say, of course, that Michigan v. EPA is correct. In our view,
the Court slipped from an unexceptional premise, that agencies should consider both the
advantages and disadvantages of their decisions, to the very different and indefensible conclu-
sion that agencies must consider those things all together, at every stage of regulatory proceed-
ings. On the contrary, the background presumption of administrative law is that agencies may
parcel out the consideration of relevant factors into different stages of proceedings or even
different proceedings. See supra note 77 (discussing Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v.
United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 230–31 (1991)). Although the presumption may of course
be overcome by clear statutory instructions to the contrary, the textual phrase “appropriate
and necessary” should have been deemed insufficient to do so. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
at 2714–15 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] micromanagement of EPA’s rulemaking,
based on little more than the word ‘appropriate’—runs counter to Congress’s allocation of
authority between the Agency and the courts.”).
147. Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the
Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1589, 1592 (2014).
1384 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1355
that have been subject to OIRA review, we certainly agree. But to the extent
that she advocates a thicker version of review for agencies that have not
engaged in rigorous cost-benefit analysis, the idea is neither an accurate
description of existing judicial practice, nor in our view a desirable shift in
doctrine. The proposal ignores the fundamental feature of agency decision-
making under conditions of severe uncertainty. To illustrate, agencies ad-
dressing health risks from pollution rarely know the exact shape of the dose-
response curve at low levels of exposure.148 The challenge is to utilize other
available information, for example effects of exposure at higher levels or
effects of exposure on animals, to make a reasoned inference about the likely
effects at low levels of exposure.149 So too agencies regulating financial mar-
kets will rarely be able to precisely state the costs or benefits of a proposed
rule because the actual effect will depend on a complex set of interdepen-
dent decisions by market participants. The problem to be solved is a lack of
certainty about those effects. To require an agency to justify its decision us-
ing the exact information that is inevitably lacking is the very opposite of
rationality. It is akin to requiring that all requests to learn an unknown
foreign language be made in that language, or that all research be funded
only if the results are already known.
But we have now moved to the question of agency decisionmaking
under uncertainty; let us take up that topic directly.
3. Connecting Facts and Choices: Uncertainty,
Rationality, and Arbitrariness
In a frequently quoted passage, State Farm announced that an agency
must “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for
its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.’ ”150 This has become a basic principle of rationality review:
agencies must explain their choices, in light of the facts. We will suggest,
however, that there is much less to this requirement than meets the eye—
both as a matter of the theory of rational decisionmaking, and under cur-
rent law. The obligation to explain choices, given the facts, is far less de-
manding than lower courts sometimes assume—although the Court itself
has usually understood the problem and followed the correct approach.
The critical problem is that facts sometimes underdetermine agency
choices. It is not necessarily the case, and perhaps not even usually the case,
that given some state of the world, the agency will always have (let alone be
able to give) reasons for choosing one policy over all competitors, or over
148. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA-SAB-EC-WKSHP-02-001, Workshop on the
Benefits of Reductions in Exposure to Hazardous Air Pollutants: Developing Best
Estimates of Dose-Response Functions 2 (2002), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab%5CSAB
PRODUCT.NSF/34355712EC011A358525719A005BF6F6/$File/ecwkshp02001%2Bappa-g.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QHK2-YBML].
149. Id. at C-1.
150. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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any given alternative. Rather, it can be the case, and may often be the case,
that agencies will face a situation in which (1) the agency is obligated to
choose; (2) there exists more than one policy that can be justified, given the
best evidence about the state of the world; and yet, (3) there is no decisive
reason to choose one policy over another.
Cases of this sort arise under genuine uncertainty, so-called Knightian
uncertainty.151 Knightian uncertainty arises when the decisionmaker has no
respectable epistemic basis for attaching probabilities to possible outcomes.
This is not to say that subjective probabilities cannot be elicited and then
attached, by brute force, but those probabilities lack any credible epistemic
warrant or foundation.
From the fact that it is always possible to elicit these subjective probabili-
ties, we should not conclude that one ought rationally to act upon them.
One could certainly elicit from a political scientist the subjective
probability that he attaches to the prediction that Norway in the year 3000
will be a democracy rather than a dictatorship, but would anyone even
contemplate acting on the basis of this numerical magnitude?152
Furthermore, it has been shown empirically that subjective probabilities are
highly sensitive to the method used to elicit them, implying that they are
artifactual.153
Absent probabilities, what is the rational decisionmaker to do? The
main issue is whether the decisionmaker should adopt a more or less opti-
mistic or pessimistic approach. At the extreme of pessimism is “maximin,”
which indicates the choice with the best worst-case outcome; at the extreme
of optimism is “maximax,” which indicates the choice with the best best-
case outcome; and indeed any weighted average of these extremes is also
possible.154 Importantly, any of these approaches is equally rational, given
the circumstances; there is no general way to arbitrate among them, no fur-
ther requirement of rationality that would knock out all but one approach.
Sometimes, of course, law will impose further constraints, even if the
theory of rational decisionmaking does not. Particular regulatory statutes
might command a highly cautious or pessimistic (“precautionary”) ap-
proach. But there is no general requirement to that effect; the law rejects any
general preference for maximin over maximax. The Supreme Court has con-
sistently overturned judges who attempt to impose on agencies a mandate to
151. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).
152. Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change 199 (1983).
153. See id. at 185–207; Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences 34–35
(1989); Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 171–72 (2006); David Kelsey &
John Quiggin, Theories of Choice Under Ignorance and Uncertainty, 6 J. Econ. Surveys 133
(1992).
154. See Kenneth J. Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for Decision-mak-
ing Under Ignorance, in Uncertainty and Expectations in Economics 1 (C. F. Carter & J.
L. Ford eds., 1972). The generalized version is the so-called “a-maximin framework,” which
models decisionmakers as choosing a parameter that may range from maximal pessimism to
maximal optimism. For a review of the literature, with legal and regulatory applications, see
Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 Geo. L.J. 901 (2011).
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make “conservative” or “worst case” assumptions under uncertainty.155
There is thus an element of irreducible discretion in agency choice under
genuine uncertainty. The facts underdetermine the choice, and as far as the
law and the theory of rational choice goes, the agency can simply choose
how pessimistic or optimistic to be.
In an important set of cases, then, agencies face a dilemma: although the
agency does best by choosing one of the available options from within the
feasible set, any choice of a particular option is necessarily arbitrary. The
agency thus faces a “rationally arbitrary decision”156: it is rational to act arbi-
trarily, in the sense of making a policy choice that cannot be justified relative
to other available choices, but can be justified by the need to make some
choice or other from within the feasible set. Rationality and arbitrariness are
usually cast as strict antonyms, but this is a confusion. Agencies acting under
uncertainty may have perfectly good second-order reasons to make one
choice or another, within the feasible set, even if they lack any first-order
reason to choose one option over another within the feasible set. In cases of
this sort, agencies act based on reasons, even if they have no first-order rea-
sons for their choices; they act arbitrarily, but have perfectly good reason to
do so.
As a recent illustration, the Secretary of the Interior was required by law
to decide whether to list the southwestern flat-tailed horned lizard as a
threatened species or not, yet there was no reliable data on the number of
extant lizards;157 “the administrative record did not support a finding that
the lizard population was viable or nonviable.”158 In such circumstances, the
agency has excellent second-order reasons—here, compliance with a legal
mandate—to make a decision one way or another, even though no decision
can be fully justified.
Courts should recognize the existence of this sort of dilemma. The hall-
mark of such cases is mirror-image reversibility: the agency’s choice of A over
B is arbitrary, in the sense that the agency can give no valid first-order rea-
son for the choice, but it is equally true that the agency can give no valid
reason for the opposite choice either. The agency is constrained to choose,
155. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 356 (1989) (finding
that under NEPA, court of appeals erred in requiring agencies to perform a “worst case analy-
sis” under uncertainty, in part because worst-case analysis “distort[s] the decisionmaking pro-
cess by overemphasizing highly speculative harms”); Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (upholding NRC’s maximally optimistic “zero-release”
assumption for spent nuclear fuels, observing that “a reviewing court must generally be at its
most deferential” when an agency “mak[es] predictions, within its area of special expertise, at
the frontiers of science”).
156. See Vermeule, supra note 9.
157. Tucson Herpetological Soc’y v. Salazar, 566 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2009); Vermeule, supra
note 9, at S9–S11.
158. Richard Murphy, We Found Out That Counting Lizard Poop Is Not a Good Way to
Count Lizards: Now What?, JOTWELL (Jan. 6, 2015) (emphasis added), http://adlaw.jotwell
.com/we-found-out-that-counting-lizard-poop-is-not-a-good-way-to-count-lizards-now-
what/ [http://perma.cc/VH9D-LJDN].
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but any choice it makes would fail ordinary arbitrariness review. Recogniz-
ing this dilemma, the court should defer to the agency’s choice.
Any other judicial approach will create deadweight losses for the system.
If the court itself picks arbitrarily, substituting its own decision for the
agency’s, there is by hypothesis no added benefit whatsoever, but there is the
extra cost of the judicial proceeding itself, including not only the out-of-
pocket costs but also the delay in reaching some choice or other. Further-
more, as we will discuss shortly under the rubric of tacit expertise, the
agency’s choice may actually be better than the court’s in ways and on
grounds that the agency cannot explain to the court; the agency may simply
have better instincts, even in situations of severe uncertainty. If, on the other
hand, the court demands first-order reasons for the agency’s choice, then
any of the agency’s possible choices can be overturned as arbitrary. On that
approach, one of two pathological results will occur. Either the agency will
be trapped in an indefinite cycle of reversal, as the court overturns every
new agency attempt to make a policy choice, or—more likely—agencies will
have powerful incentives to engage in a charade, in which they offer the
reviewing court bogus first-order reasons to prefer one alternative over the
other. In such situations, it is pathological for courts to relentlessly demand
that the agency supply first-order reasons that in the nature of things cannot
be given. At the frontier of uncertainty, rationality simply runs out.
Two doctrinal conclusions follow, one involving Section 706(2)(A) of
the APA, the other involving State Farm and the rational connection test.
The first conclusion is that decisions may be arbitrary in a theoretical sense
without being arbitrary in a legal sense. In cases involving mirror-image
reversibility, agency decisionmaking may be rationally arbitrary but not le-
gally arbitrary.
The second conclusion is that in cases of this sort, agencies may validly
select policies without a direct connection between the facts found and the
choices made. Because the facts and the state of the world underdetermine
choices, agencies cannot reasonably be asked to show, based on the facts,
that the choice they make is superior to the alternatives. This is not to say
that there is no rational connection between facts and choices. It is to say
that the nature of the rational connection is different than in standard cases.
The rational connection lies at the second order, not the first; it arises be-
cause the agency has good reason to decide, even if it lacks good reason for
the decision. In this sense, the State Farm test of rational connection is more
capacious, more forgiving, and less demanding than is conventionally
understood.
So far we have said nothing at all about the empirical incidence of such
cases. Our claim is analytic, and will hold, or not, regardless of the nature of
the problems that actual agencies actually face. Still, if only to underscore
the importance of getting the right conceptions of rationality and rationality
review, it is worth recording our sense of the matter.
On one view, which is certainly possible and which cannot be refuted
on a priori grounds, cases of genuine uncertainty are rare in the field of
agency decisionmaking; agencies mostly encounter problems of risk, to
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which quantifiable probabilities can be attached, and to which quantified
cost-benefit can be applied. Our view is different. Agencies frequently en-
counter novel problems at the frontiers of scientific and technical knowl-
edge, such that even expert probability assessments are unreliable and real
uncertainty is pervasive. The ordinary problems of risk assessment and regu-
lation, involving calculable probabilities and known risks, have a diminish-
ing market share over time, as agencies handle easy problems and move on
to more difficult ones. When agencies face regulatory choices premised on
guesses about the effects of climate change,159 or the chances of a novel type
of domestic terror attack,160 or the future of a species whose number is sim-
ply unknown,161 or the effects of a novel regulatory constraint on share-
holder voting,162 they face choices in which any probability assessments lack
respectable epistemic foundations—they face genuine uncertainty. A sensi-
ble theory of rationality review has to take account of the pervasive presence
of uncertainty in the administrative state.
4. Comparative Policy Evaluation (Over Time)
Uncertainty has another critical dimension, involving the rationality of
information-gathering by agencies. Rational agencies will invest resources in
acquiring information, which may resolve Knightian uncertainty, transform-
ing it into risk or even certainty.163 Yet “in some cases the value of further
investments in information gathering will itself be genuinely uncertain.”164 If
so, the problem of rational arbitrariness will replicate itself at this higher
level as well.165 In a genuinely uncertain choice environment, the deci-
sionmaker must stop the search for the best policy sooner or later, some-
where or other, or else fall into an infinite regress—deciding whether to
acquire information about the costs of acquiring further information, and so
on.166 Policymaking under uncertainty is
like going into a big forest to pick mushrooms. One may explore the pos-
sibilities in a certain limited region, but at some point one must stop the
explorations and start picking because further explorations as to the possi-
bility of finding more and better mushrooms by walking a little bit further
159. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
160. See Tri-Valley CAREs v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 671 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012); Jifry v.
FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
161. See Tucson Herpetological Soc’y, 566 F.3d 870.
162. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
163. Vermeule, supra note 9, at S4.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at S21. See generally Hans O. Melberg, A Critical Discussion of Jon Elster’s Argu-
ments About Rational Choice, Infinite Regress and the Collection of Information (May 1999)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oslo) (on file with author).
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would defeat the purpose of the hike. One must decide to stop the explora-
tions on an intuitive basis, i.e. without actually investigating whether fur-
ther exploration would have yielded better results.167
In administrative law, the problem of information acquisition arises
most critically with respect to arbitrariness review, particularly the scope of
agencies’ obligation to consider and evaluate policy alternatives. We have
seen that although both State Farm and successor cases explicitly repudiate
the idea that agencies must consider all feasible policy alternatives,168 many
judges act as though there is such an obligation, often without quite saying
so. The underlying impulse here is the tempting thought that comparative
policy evaluation is a necessary element of rational decisionmaking, for
agencies or indeed for any institution or actor. Surely, the intuition runs,
rationality requires choosing the best option, relative to the chooser’s prefer-
ences, within the feasible set of choices. Suppose there is an agency charged
with reducing air pollution, at acceptable cost; and suppose the agency were
to say that “policy P is cheaper than policy Q, and P yields more reduction
in air pollution. But Q isn’t bad at all; we think it’s good enough. We choose
Q.” Isn’t that irrational?
Judges who reason this way have an entirely legitimate intuition, but
they fail to realize that the intuition does not always hold, and that the con-
ditions under which it fails to hold are especially likely to arise in the admin-
istrative setting. The underlying issue is the validity of “satisficing”—of
picking something on the ground that it is “good enough.”169 Satisficing is
intrinsically noncomparative. The satisficer picks a feasible option whose
quality exceeds some predefined aspiration level, regardless of whether there
might be an even better option somewhere in the feasible set.170 In real life,
people constantly satisfice; indeed, people who relentlessly seek the best pos-
sible option have a mad air about them. The ubiquity of satisficing should
alert judges that comparative policy evaluation is an approach that makes
sense only under particular conditions.
What are those conditions, and what are the conditions under which
satisficing is sensible? Satisficing becomes sensible in the presence of sub-
stantial costs of information and search—in a word, under uncertainty.171 In
the earlier example, the agency’s choice of Q over P was irrational only be-
cause the context of choice was entirely static and transparent; the options
were known, as were their full costs and benefits. In static contexts, absent
167. Jon Elster, Bad Timing, in The Thief of Time 87, 96 (Chrisoula Andreou & Mark D.
White eds., 2010) (quoting Leif Johansen, 1 Lectures on Macroeconomic Planning 144
(1977)).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 71–80.
169. Michael Byron, Satisficing and Optimality, 109 Ethics 67, 72 (1998).
170. See Michael Slote, Beyond Optimizing 7–10 (1989).
171. See Herbert A. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs 85 (1983); Byron, supra note
169, at 71; Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. Econ. 99, 112
(1955).
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uncertainty, satisficing is indeed irrational and comparative policy evalua-
tion is indispensable.172 In more dynamic contexts, however, satisficing
comes into its own. The satisficing decisionmaker applies a stopping rule
that constrains the open-ended search for the very best policy, in favor of
one that meets or exceeds the aspiration level.173
The crucial twist here is that, while satisficing is a rational strategy for
agents with limited time and information who are forced to make choices
under uncertainty, the selection of an aspiration level is itself inescapably
arbitrary. Nothing in the idea of satisficing, or in the choice situation itself,
tells the rationally satisficing agent where to locate the aspiration level,
higher or lower. In that sense, satisficing is a strategy of rational a-rational-
ity, of rationally arbitrary decisionmaking. It is an approach that seemingly
lacks any justification in first-order reason—an observer may well complain
“why did you stop there, not somewhere else?”—but it is justified as a strat-
egy, over an array of problems, by higher-order considerations.
All this is important because uncertainty pervades regulation and other
forms of agency policymaking. In the administrative setting, choices are
rarely fully-specified, static and transparent. The chronic condition of
agency policymaking is the search for sensible policies under uncertainty. At
some point, the agency will have to suspend the search and choose some-
thing good enough, even if it is abstractly possible that there exists a better
policy that is technically feasible. Administrative law doctrine, at its best,
recognizes exactly this point by underscoring that agencies’ obligation to
172. Cf. David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency 28–40 (1995) [herein-
after Schmidtz, Rational Choice]; David Schmidtz, Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strat-
egy, in Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason 30, 31
(Michael Byron ed., 2004).
173. In the presence of information costs and search costs, another strategy is constrained
optimization. On this approach, decisionmakers should invest in gathering information just
up to the point at which the (increasing) marginal costs of doing so equal the expected margi-
nal benefits of further information. Cf. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J.
Pol. Econ. 213, 216 (1961). Whereas the satisficer stops when the choice at hand is good
enough, the constrained optimizer stops looking for a better choice when the marginal benefit
of finding a better option, discounted by the probability of finding such an option, is equal to
or less than the marginal costs of further search. The optimizing approach, however, assumes
that the decisionmaker always has epistemically well-grounded probability distributions over
the marginal costs and benefits of further search—an assumption we reject. In any event, the
two strategies are simply different. “An optimizing strategy places limits on how much we are
willing to invest in seeking alternatives. A satisficing strategy places limits on how much we
insist on finding before we quit that search and turn our attention to other matters.”
Schmidtz, Rational Choice, supra note 172, at 34–35; see also Jonathan Brodie Bendor et al.,
Satisficing: A ‘Pretty Good’ Heuristic, 9 B.E. J. Theoretical Econ. 1 (2009). Finally, even were
it true that satisficing is just a form of optimization-under-constraints, our substantive point
in text would be unaffected. Whether agency decisionmaking under uncertainty is described as
satisficing or as constrained optimization, the substantive point is that comparative evaluation
of policies is not always required by rationality—and FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556
U.S. 502, 515 (2009), holds that it is not required by administrative law. See infra text accom-
panying notes 182–188.
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consider policy alternatives is limited to reasonable alternatives.174 The adjec-
tive represents an implicit recognition that consideration of technically feasi-
ble alternatives is often a game not worth the candle. Even in State Farm, the
Court was careful to specifically deny that agencies have any obligation to
“consider all policy alternatives in reaching decision.”175
That denial has sometimes been forgotten by lower federal courts. At its
worst, intrusive judicial review threatens to create an infinite regress, in
which agencies have to be able to give reasons for suspending the search for
optimal policies, reasons that require the very information whose absence is
the reason for stopping in the first place. “The reason agencies do not ex-
plore all arguments or consider all alternatives is one of practical limits of
time and resources. Yet, to have to explain all this to a reviewing court risks
imposing much of the very burden that not considering alternatives aims to
escape.”176
As in other settings, however, the Supreme Court often displays a better
understanding of uncertainty and its significance for administrative law than
do the lower courts.177 Thus Baltimore Gas allowed the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to adopt a maximally optimistic assumption about the environ-
mental effects of spent nuclear fuel in the remote future, an assumption of
“zero-release.”178 In our terms, Baltimore Gas recognized that under uncer-
tainty maximax is just as valid as maximin.179 More importantly still, FCC v.
Fox180 squarely held that comparative policy evaluation is not a general re-
quirement of rational agency decisionmaking. Agencies have no general legal
obligation, as far as the APA is concerned, to show that the chosen policy is
the best among the feasible alternatives, relative to the agency’s stated goals.
As the Court put it,
[T]he agency must show that there are good reasons for the new policy.
But it need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for
174. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev.
363, 393 (1986); see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 551 (1978); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. FERC, 912 F.2d 1471, 1484–85 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(per curiam) (finding that FERC need not consider an alternative project that was not reason-
able under statutory requirements); City of New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.2d 732,
744 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that DOT need not consider the barging of nuclear waste, as it was
an unreasonable alternative).
175. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983).
176. Breyer, supra note 174, at 393.
177. For a stellar recent exception to this generalization, see Center for Sustainable Econ-
omy v. Jewell, 779 F.3d 588, 610–12 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (allowing Interior Department to treat
option value—the informational value of delaying a decision—in qualitative rather than quan-
titative terms).
178. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 104 (1983).
179. On this view, the NRC’s assumption of “zero-release” of spent nuclear fuels should
not be taken too literally. It was not a prediction that not one iota of such fuels would ever be
released. Rather it was a policy choice, one that opted for maximax assumptions—highly opti-
mistic assumptions—in the presence of severe uncertainty. Id. at 92.
180. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
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the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons
for it, and that the agency believes it to be better . . . .181
The obligation to show that “there are good reasons for the new policy,”
coupled with the lack of any obligation to show that chosen policy is better
than the alternatives, is in effect a satisficing approach, rather than a com-
parative one.
A wrinkle in Fox is that the issue of comparative policy evaluation in the
case involved a change in agency position over time. The case involved a
change of agency policy; the principal dissent, by Justice Breyer, urged that
agencies should have to show the comparative superiority of the new pol-
icy—a somewhat puzzling stance, given Breyer’s usual sensitivity to the im-
possible burdens that a requirement of full comparative evaluation would
impose.182 The Court rejected Breyer’s view as too demanding. The Court
observed—citing State Farm, quite correctly—that rationality review re-
quires agencies to take into account data that can “readily be obtained,” but
does not require “obtaining the unobtainable.”183 To be sure, the Court ad-
ded critical qualifiers that close some of the distance between majority and
dissent. The Court, for example, acknowledged that agencies should explain
changes in factual assertions, and should take into account knowable and
known costs of transition to the new policy (“reliance interests”).184 But
there remains an irreducible difference between majority and dissent: the
Court is very clear that comparative policy evaluation, in and of itself, is not
a requirement of rationality review.185
The Fox principle, denying any agency obligation to engage in compara-
tive policy evaluation, fits perfectly with the principle that agencies may pro-
ceed one step at a time, enjoying “broad discretion” to parcel out policy
questions across different proceedings, present and future.186 The two princi-
ples actually entail one another. Because agencies need not consider all rele-
vant alternatives now, they cannot have any obligation to show that the
currently chosen action is superior to the relevant alternatives, which may be
allocated to a separate proceeding entirely, or simply put off the table for the
time being. The point common to both principles is that agencies need only
181. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515.
182. See Breyer, supra note 174.
183. Fox, 556 U.S. at 519.
184. Id. at 515.
185. Ronald M. Levin summarizes Fox as follows: “The Court’s position on the issue
comes down to this: Unless reliance interests or inconsistent readings of a factual record are
involved, open acknowledgment of the change and a defense of the new policy on its own
terms should ordinarily suffice.” Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox
Television, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 555, 573 (2011). The latter clause is what the Fox majority and
dissent disagreed about.
186. Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211, 230
(1991).
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have some adequate reason for what they do now; they need not rank possi-
ble actions and show that the one chosen is best.
Whether the issue is comparative evaluation of feasible policy choices at
a given time, or over time, the point is the same. Under uncertainty, in the
presence of costs of information and search, rationality does not require
agencies to show that they have chosen the best of the technically feasible
alternatives. Thanks to Fox, the prevailing law of rationality review does not
require that either.
5. Accuracy vs. Other Values: Tradeoffs and Decision Rules
Lurking in the background of thick rationality review is an assumption
that arbitrariness review requires the agency to make the best decision, in
the narrow sense, identifying the optimal policy response to the complete set
of facts that are known or could be discovered. We have already shown that
this idea is inconsistent with existing Supreme Court doctrine, which neither
requires optimal cost-benefit balancing nor requires that the agency identify
and adopt the best of all feasible policy alternatives.187 There are also a range
of other conditions under which, for good second-order reasons, rationality
review does not require that the agency pick the best expected policy, in the
first-order sense.
a. Mean-Variance Tradeoffs
A standard problem for agencies (and all decisionmakers) involves
mean-variance tradeoffs. When making predictions about the effects of dif-
ferent policies, agencies must predict the most likely or average effect of a
policy. The agency’s “best guess,” for example, might be that changing the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ozone will save
10,000 lives. But that estimate—the average or mean—has a variance as well.
The better the information or data the agency has, the lower the variance.
The more speculative or uncertain the information, the higher the variance.
Just to illustrate, a good estimate might entail a variance of plus or minus
1,000 lives; a lower quality estimate might entail a variance of plus or minus
8,000 lives.188
Assuming the agency has already gathered all cost-justified information,
it is entirely rational to pick the policy with the lower expected number of
lives saved if that policy option also produces a smaller variance. Take an
extreme example for the sake of crisply illustrating the point. If policy A is
expected to save 10,000 lives, plus or minus 9,000, and policy B is expected
to save 9,999 lives, plus or minus 1, rationality does not require policy A,
and it might very well require the opposite. To give a more banal example,
suppose that one’s ideal temperature is 72 degrees. When choosing between
187. See discussion supra Section II.A.2.c.
188. We use the plus or minus nomenclature only for expositional purposes. The agency is
summarizing a probability distribution and we could explain with the mean-variance problem
with greater formality. The point here is a simple one, however.
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two potential vacation locales, it is entirely rational to choose spot A with an
average temperature of 70 degrees plus or minus 2 degrees, instead of locale
B which has an average temperature of 72 degrees plus or minus 20 degrees.
There are many contexts in which variance is more important than the
mean, and at a minimum, it is well within the bounds of rationality—on
any standard conception—to prefer locale A as a vacation destination to
locale B. Agencies face analogous decisions constantly. A strong form of ra-
tionality review that requires agencies to pick policy alternative with the
highest expected return would be seriously misguided. Mean-variance trade-
offs exist in almost any agency decisionmaking setting and agencies should
not be required to ignore them by a confused formulation of rationality
review by courts.
b. Speed vs. Accuracy
Increasingly, agencies are asked to formulate new rules under significant
time pressure. The timelines that Dodd-Frank established for the promulga-
tion of hundreds of new rules regulating the financial industry were aston-
ishingly short, and as a consequence most of the deadlines were missed by
the agencies.189 The Food and Drug Administration was successfully sued
because it failed to meet the aggressive time-frame established by the Food
Safety Modernization Act.190 Statutory deadlines respond, in part, to long-
standing criticism in the commentary that the pace of agency rulemakings
was too slow.191
Whether or not agencies, in fact, tend to move too slowly, it is clearly
true that that agencies are often under pressure to act more quickly. In the
case of true emergencies, the “good cause” exception of the APA will allow
agencies to avoid notice-and-comment requirements at least for a brief time
period.192 Yet this is only relevant to a particular subset of agency action,
involving legislative rulemaking; there are many other cases in which speed
is of the essence. Dollars or lives may be lost if agencies move slowly. In such
cases, agencies face an inevitable tradeoff between speed and accuracy.
The speed-accuracy tradeoff is an important special case of the costs of
information-gathering. With more careful study, consultation, the design of
189. See Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative
Process, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 689, 692, 724–25 (2013).
190. See Ctr. for Food Safety v. Hamburg, 954 F. Supp. 2d 965 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
191. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk
Regulation (1993) (explaining the “vicious circle” caused by systemic problems with the
regulatory system); McGarity, supra note 66 (criticizing the rigid restraints imposed on infor-
mal rulemakings); Pierce, supra note 66 (criticizing judicially-induced rulemaking ossification
and discussing potential judicial solutions); Paul R. Verkuil, Commentary, Rulemaking Ossifi-
cation—A Modest Proposal, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 453 (1995) (criticizing Pierce’s proposed judi-
cial solutions to rulemaking ossification and proposing alternative legislative solutions).
192. See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding, against arbitrari-
ness challenge, an FAA regulation promulgated without notice and comment under the “good
cause” exception); see also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 Harv. L.
Rev. 1095, 1122–25 (2009) (examining the “good cause” exception).
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new experiments, the construction of new models, and so on, agencies could
more accurately identify the best policy. Yet rationality will sometimes dic-
tate acting quickly, trading accuracy for speed, because of the costs of wait-
ing. Indeed, a rule that always favors more accurate decisionmaking and
ignores temporal problems would arguably be irrational—not to mention
that it would result in virtually no agency action ever. As should be immedi-
ately clear, this is a problem for thicker forms of arbitrariness review, which
require a strongly rational connection between the facts known and the
choice made.193 It is often rational, indeed optimal, to not spend the time
gathering information so that a clear rational connection exists between par-
ticular facts and the particular choice made, because that would require sac-
rificing the benefits of expedition. This sort of tradeoff does not always exist,
but it sometimes does exist, and arbitrariness review should be flexible
enough to accommodate.
c. Asymmetric Error Costs
Administrative law doctrine on arbitrariness review tends to obfuscate
the problem of asymmetric error costs. Criminal law has long been focused
on these sorts of costs. The Blackstone principle—that it is better to let ten
guilty persons go free than to convict one innocent person—is a potential
justification for many defendant-favoring rules of criminal procedure.194
This principle is an outgrowth of the problem of asymmetric error costs: it is
much worse to err by putting an innocent person in prison than to err by
putting a guilty person on the street, or so the argument goes. Irrespective of
whether one agrees with this intuition,195 problems of asymmetric error
costs abound in the law. Decisions about whether to list endangered species
have this flavor. Failing to list a species that should have been protected will
result in extinction; listing a species that didn’t need to be protected will
result in some financial costs but can be corrected at some later point. Fail-
ing to regulate a new pollutant that should have been regulated will result in
illness and deaths. Regulating a new pollutant unnecessarily will result in
financial costs.
The costs of making mistakes in administrative law are often asymmet-
ric, and it is perfectly rational for agencies to take asymmetric error costs
into account. Even if the best available evidence suggests the best policy al-
ternative is X, it is rational for an agency to select policy Y because the costs
of error are not symmetric. This is one common justification for the “pre-
cautionary principle.”196 Even if the agency has failed to pick the best policy
193. Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. Rev.
721, 758–60 (2014).
194. Daniel Epps, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1065
(2015) (describing and challenging the Blackstone principle).
195. See, e.g., id. at 1094–124 (offering a “dynamic” critique of the Blackstone principle
based on its systemic consequences for the criminal justice system).
196. See Barnabas Dickson, The Precautionary Principle in CITES: A Critical Assessment, 39
Nat. Resources J. 211, 211–15 (1999).
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in a first-order sense, it has good second-order reasons for not doing so. The
agency’s decision rule is rational, even if its narrow decision is not. It is an
open question whether (lower) courts would accept this sort of justification,
but they should.
6. Tacit Expertise
Finally, the literature on rationality review has entirely ignored a crucial
distinction between having reasons and giving reasons.197 Here two different
strands of thought about rationality review come to the fore. In one strand,
the desirable thing, the thing rationality review aims to produce, is to ensure
that agencies have good reason for what they do. On this conception, if
reviewing courts (or other reviewing institutions) could somehow be as-
sured that agencies were in fact acting based on reasons, then it wouldn’t
matter if those reasons were never actually communicated to courts. The
communication itself has a strictly derivative and incidental value; it is a
strictly evidentiary mechanism, one that helps courts or other reviewers to
flush out illicit agency motivations by comparing the agency’s actions to its
stated rationales. But in principle the communication of reasons by agencies
could be dispensed with if the judges were otherwise assured that agencies
were acting on the basis of valid reasons.
On a very different conception, the act of public communication of
agency reasons is itself valuable, independent of its evidentiary function. The
public communication may enable nonjudicial oversight of agencies, pro-
mote democratic transparency, and give agencies ex ante incentives to for-
mulate rational policies, in light of the looming prospect that they will be
obliged to explain the policies to third parties. On this conception, it is im-
portant not merely that agencies have reasons, but that they give them.
These two conceptions will diverge entirely if there exists a class of cases
in which agencies have reasons they cannot give, explain or convey, at ac-
ceptable cost. Unfortunately, there is every reason to think that such cases
not only exist, but are common. Tacit expertise is a widespread phenome-
non. In many fields, experts have tacit knowledge that they cannot commu-
nicate, at least at acceptable cost, to generalist observers or other nonexperts.
Tacit knowledge is how-to local knowledge. In Hayek’s terms, it is based on
“particulars”—“circumstances of time and place” that “by [their] nature
cannot enter into statistics and therefore cannot be conveyed to any central
authority in statistical form.”198 Because such knowledge is ubiquitous, there
is always a question whether those who can do something are able to explain
how they do it. Those who can do often can’t teach.
Although some tacit expertise may simply be incommunicable in princi-
ple (riding a bicycle is the stock example: one can show how to ride, but not
197. For an overview of relevant philosophical literature, see Harry Collins, Tacit and
Explicit Knowledge (2010).
198. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 524 (1945).
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explain how to ride in the abstract), probably the more common case in-
volves tacit expertise that can be explained with sufficient time and effort.
The issue is the cost of doing so. If the cost is substantial, there will be cases
in which forcing an explanation is simply not worth it. In such cases, that is,
decisionmakers will have legitimate tacit reasons for their choices, reasons
that cannot be communicated to reviewers at acceptable cost.
a. Tacit Expertise, Agencies, and Courts
In the administrative state, agencies have trouble explaining to generalist
reviewers critical elements of regulatory problems that line experts, acting in
the field and saturated with local, field-specific knowledge, understand on
an essentially intuitive basis.199 Presumably for just this reason, in the in-
traexecutive setting, a critical OMB guidance document on cost-benefit anal-
ysis observes that “professional judgment” is essential to high-quality
regulatory analysis, especially when nonquantifiable costs and benefits are at
issue.200 Courts should certainly be no more skeptical of expert professional
judgment than is OMB. Judicial review should take into account the exis-
tence of cases in which agencies possess tacit expertise and thus have reasons
it is costly for them to give.
It goes without saying that the opposite cases also exist, in which agen-
cies have no sensible reason for their choices, or are making decisions based
on biased information, or political motivations in the pejorative sense. In
such cases, the requirement to not only have a (public-regarding) reason,
but to give such a reason, may prevent arbitrary agency behavior. Our point
is simply that these two types of cases are both real; both must be taken into
account by the institutional calculus. A review procedure that is oblivious to
the phenomenon of tacit expertise will code some set of cases as instances of
arbitrary agency action, in the sense of unreasoned agency action, when in
reality they are cases of reasoned action that cannot be explained at accept-
able cost. Again, it is a separate question whether the best legal conception
of rational agency decisionmaking should or should not code such cases as
“arbitrary.” But without appreciation of the issue of tacit expertise, one can-
not even recognize the critical questions.
In the real world, a review procedure that is oblivious to tacit expertise
will induce coping tactics and tactics of self-defense by agencies confronted
199. For an illuminating analysis of “craft expertise” based on experience, very much
compatible with our approach here, see Sidney A. Shapiro, The Failure to Understand Exper-
tise in Administrative Law: The Problem and the Consequences (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Michigan Law Review). For a first stab at the “tacit expertise” issue,
see Adrian Vermeule, Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State, in Law, Liberty
and State: Oakeshott, Hayek and Schmitt on the Rule of Law 295 (David Dyzenhaus &
Thomas Poole eds., 2015).
200. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis 2-3
(2003). For a comprehensive and persuasive defense of professional judgment in regulatory
analysis, see Coates, supra note 53.
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with generalist reviewers.201 Unable to convey the real, albeit tacit, grounds
for decision to the reviewers at acceptable cost, agencies will tend to substi-
tute articulable reasons for their real reasons. The articulable reasons will fit
the agency’s behavior less well than the true, tacit grounds of decision; the
result will be a kind of distortion in the process of agency reason-giving, a
distortion arising from the limitations of the reviewers. This is law’s answer
to the Heisenberg effect: the act of observing an agency’s reasoning, through
hard look review, changes the nature of the agency’s reasoning itself.
The distortion induced by the effect is a cost, insofar as the goal of the
review system is to ensure that agencies act based on expertise. If the system
places some positive independent value on publicly communicable reasons,
then that distortion may or may not be a price worth paying; but one should
at least be clear that a price is in fact being paid. All we aim to establish here
is that a system of review that is oblivious to the phenomenon of tacit exper-
tise will produce false positives. It will falsely code some agency decisions as
cases of genuinely arbitrary decisionmaking, when in fact the agency is act-
ing on the basis of genuine expertise. To call such decisions unreasoned is
merely to underscore the limitations of the reviewers, not the reviewed.
b. The Pretext Problem and Some Rules of Thumb
Let us make the preceding intuitions somewhat more systematic. We
have underscored the existence of cases in which judicial recognition of tacit
expertise would allow agencies to act on the basis of reasons they have but
do not give. This is, of course, only one side of the ledger. The other side is
the problem of pretext. Judicial recognition of tacit expertise implies the
possibility that agencies may claim to have tacit reasons that do not actually
exist. The Type I error is judicial failure to recognize tacit expertise when it
does exist, resulting in erroneous invalidation of agency action; the Type II
error is to deferring to nonexistent tacit expertise, resulting in erroneous
validation of agency action.
The overall picture may be sketched this way. An agency might have
good or bad reasons (somehow defined) for a decision and the giving of
reasons to judges might generate good or bad effects, depending on the case.
Consider four possibilities:
(1) The agency has bad reasons (however defined) for its decision and
requiring the agency to offer a rational account of its decisionmaking
catches the bad reasons, allowing the court to strike down the agency
action as arbitrary.
(2) The agency has bad reasons but can articulate a plausible pretext, so
arbitrariness review fails to stop the action, notwithstanding the rea-
son-giving requirement.
(3) The agency has good reasons and honestly articulates them. Here, the
requirement of reason-giving does not fix a problem because there is
201. Cf. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 Harv. L. Rev.
1755 (2013) (exploring how agencies may act strategically to avoid presidential review).
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no problem to fix, but it nonetheless imposes some costs perhaps
modest, perhaps extensive, because tacit expertise has to be repre-
sented to generalist judges.
(4) The agency has good reasons for its decision, but those reasons are
grounded in tacit expertise, and are too costly to communicate as such.
A requirement of reason-giving makes it more likely a court will
wrongly strike down the action as arbitrary because the agency must
articulate a false reason for a policy or imperfectly convey the real rea-
son for a policy.
Thick rationality review, requiring agencies not only to have reasons but
to explain them to the satisfaction of generalist judges, does well in case (1),
but does poorly in cases (2), (3) and (4). For the reasons noted above, we
suggest that case (4) is plausibly quite common. After all, the motivating
assumption for most of administrative law is information asymmetry.202 If
Congress or courts could easily learn all the agency knows, the information
asymmetry problem would recede, and agencies wouldn’t really be necessary
at all. If it is implausible that tacit expertise can always or even usually be
communicated to a reviewing court at reasonable cost, then thick rationality
review is likely to make matters worse, not better.
However, we need not establish, and do not claim to know—which re-
view procedure is best overall. Our minimum point for present purposes is
merely that both the Type I error and the Type II error exist, and both are
costly. Administrative law’s approach to judicial review should take both
errors into account in an optimizing calculus, minimizing the total costs of
the two types. The challenge would be for law to develop principles, stan-
dards, or rules of thumb that would allow courts to sort between cases
where agencies are more or less likely to possess genuine tacit expertise. How
exactly this should work is a topic for another paper; tacit expertise is an
idea that deserves more extended treatment than we can give it here. We will
limit ourselves to a brief preliminary sketch of some rules of thumb for
reviewing courts.
To be clear, these rules of thumb are just indirect proxies, and will thus
be necessarily imperfect. They are proxies because courts cannot, by defini-
tion, directly observe the state of agencies’ tacit expertise to decide whether a
particular claim of tacit expertise is plausible. If such direct observation were
possible, the whole problem would disappear. All courts will be able to de-
velop are imperfect sorting principles that help them to decide whether the
Type I or Type II error is more likely in the given case at hand.
Statistical versus experiential questions. The main proxy must always be
the nature of the issue at hand. Recall Hayek’s distinction between local
knowledge of “circumstances of time and place,” on the one hand, and gen-
eral knowledge that can be expressed in statistical form for transmission to a
central authority, on the other.203 Some agency decisions turn on statistical
202. See supra Section II.A.5.c.
203. See supra text accompanying note 198.
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facts—generalized legislative facts, subject to measurement and method-
ological contestation. Other agency decisions turn on localized knowledge
acquired through experience with a particular industry or with particular
actors within the industry, whether individuals or firms. At a certain point,
the United States stopped conducting live tests of new forms of nuclear
weaponry, and turned to statistical modeling of the likely effects of (hypo-
thetical) detonations.204 Whatever its larger merits, the downside of this ap-
proach was that only veteran engineers had personal experience with test
detonations, and only they could answer critical questions about how new
weapons were likely to work in practice, as opposed to within equations.205
So too, problems of industrial hygiene involve experience-based best prac-
tices, on which abstract economic expertise gets little purchase.206 Tacit ex-
pertise is more or less likely to arise in different contexts, and courts should
be sensitive, above all, to the type of issue before them.
Character and traits. A special type of local knowledge—but a ubiqui-
tous type—is knowledge about the character and traits of individuals (and
perhaps of firms, although there is a separate and interesting question about
whether firms have a character). Agencies must often make judgments based
at least in part on the character of particular people—CEOs, for example—
with whom they interact. Over time, officials in agencies will come to un-
derstand, in a quasi-intuitive way, who is to be trusted and who is not. As an
example of this thick practical knowledge, consider agency staff who possess
the savvy, born of experience, to discern which automobile executives are
204. Donald MacKenzie & Graham Spinardi, Tacit Knowledge and the Uninvention of Nu-
clear Weapons, in Knowing Machines: Essays on Technical Change 215, 256 (Donald
MacKenzie ed., 1996).
205. Donald MacKenzie, Moving Toward Disinvention, Bull. Atomic Scientists,
Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 4, 4:
Testing made designers’ competence visible. In heated design reviews at the labs, those
whose opinions really counted were the “test-seasoned” designers. They had shown that
they knew when computer models could be relied upon, and when they could not. So
they were fit people to judge neophytes’ proposals. . . . [Veteran designers] warned us
repeatedly of the dangers of reliance on simulations and laboratory tests alone. “You start
to believe your calculations, and young folks really believe them if the old timers have
left,” said one. “People start to believe the codes are absolutely true, to lose touch with
reality,” said another. . . . One key issue is the distinction between explicit and tacit
knowledge. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be written down and preserved in
diagrams, documents, and computer files. Tacit knowledge is the motor skills, intuition,
“common sense,” and judgment that cannot be transmitted in words or equations alone.
Both are vital in scientific and technical endeavor. Few of us would wish to come under
the knife of a surgeon who possessed only explicit knowledge. The history of nuclear
weaponry is of repeated discovery that explicit knowledge alone is not enough. . . . The
ultimate value of nuclear testing to weapons designers was that it served as a check of the
quality of the tacit knowledge they, and those who built the weapons, brought to their
task. . . . Knowledge of the physics that makes nuclear weapons possible is humanity’s
permanent inheritance. But that is not true of the assembled, partially tacit, largely engi-
neering-based skills that make nuclear weapons technological realities rather than draw-
ing-board concepts.
See also MacKenzie & Spinardi, supra note 204, at 215–58.
206. McGarity, supra note 93, at 281.
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bluffing about the capabilities of their firms and about the costs to those
firms of various regulatory outcomes.207 Such knowledge will often be costly
or downright impossible to document, in any convincing way, for a third
party, such as a court exercising judicial review. But it is a real form of
knowledge nonetheless.
Agency reputation. Finally, the pretext problem is self-limiting, because
agencies that constantly base their decisions on (putatively) nontransmis-
sible tacit expertise will encounter increasing skepticism from reviewing
courts over time. Notwithstanding the theoretical uniformity of standards of
review, the D.C. Circuit sees a steady stream of decisions from a recurrent
set of the same agencies.208 Some agencies have credibility established over
many years; others suffer from the opposite problem. Just as certain advo-
cates get more credibility and perhaps the benefit of the doubt during oral
argument, some agencies do as well. When this occurs, what appears to be
the a robust form of arbitrariness review is rather a form of escalating re-
view, in which the intensity of judicial investigation grows over time as an
agency repeatedly declines to articulate justifications for its decisions, be-
yond an appeal to tacit expertise.
* * *
We do not claim to have done justice to the formidably complex, yet
indispensable, idea of tacit expertise. All we have attempted to do here is to
sketch some basic issues and possible lines of analysis, in order to open up
new questions for another time. For purposes of rationality review, all we
need establish is our minimum point: courts should take into account not
only the risk of pretext, but the countervailing risk that agencies have tacit,
experiential reasons for action that they cannot explain to generalist judges
(at least not at acceptable cost).
B. Agency Rationality: A Positive Formulation
So far we have been relentlessly negative. To some degree, negativity is
inherent in the nature of our project, indeed the very point of our project;
our principal claim is that there is and should be less to rationality review
than some judges and commentators seem to think. Nonetheless, it is in-
cumbent on us to articulate a positive formulation of agency rationality and
rationality review, in order to offer an alternative to the hard look approach
we reject.
In our positive formulation, the best interpretation of section 706(2)(A),
and of rationality review, is simple indeed: agencies must act based on rea-
sons. In this simple conception, the aim of section 706(2)(A) is to exclude
agency action that rests on no reasons whatsoever, at any order of analysis—
the core meaning of “arbitrary and capricious.” The key difference between
our conception and the hard look conception is that the former, unlike the
207. This example was helpfully suggested by Lisa Heinzerling (personal communication).
208. See Miles & Sunstein, supra note 42, at 796–97.
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latter, takes account of nonideal constraints on agency decisionmaking. It
recognizes that limits of time, information, and resources may give agencies
good second-order reasons to act inaccurately, nonrationally, or arbitrarily,
in a first-order sense. In a particularly naive version of rationality review—a
version that nonetheless appears with some frequency in judicial opinions,
usually in an implicit form—agencies must have fully specified first-order
reasons for their choices, reasons that justify their choices relative to all com-
petitors, in light of the statutory policy goals.209
Our conception opens up space for agencies to act based on reasons at a
second-or-higher order. Such reasons may, for example, justify a policy that
seems acceptable, but might well be worse than other possible policies in the
feasible set (for satisficing); justify acting when taking some action or other
is necessary or desirable, even when no particular action is sufficiently justi-
fied (a rationally arbitrary decision); justify a policy under a decision rule
that can predictably be expected to misfire, producing arbitrary results, in
some set of cases (the mean-variance tradeoff and the speed-accuracy trade-
off). In all these cases, agencies rightly depart from the simplistic benchmark
under which rationality requires choosing the best option within the
(known) feasible set. By parallel, arbitrariness review must also depart from
the simplistic idea that courts should require agencies to explain, in a first-
order sense, why their chosen policies represent the best choice from the
(known) feasible set.
Reasonableness and rationality. We have described this approach as a
thin theory of agency rationality, because agencies who act in the ways we
have described are emphatically acting rationally at the second-or-higher or-
der. The nonrationality or arationality of their behavior, at the first order, is
in the service of rational strategies for coping with environments in which
ordinary first-order rationality runs out or misfires. It is worth mentioning,
however, a different description of the problem that some find congenial,
and that works equally well for our purposes.
On this alternative description, we might distinguish reasonable agency
action from fully rational agency action. When agencies bump up against
the limitations of rational choice, as when they (arbitrarily) pick an aspira-
tion level in order to satisfice under uncertainty, they are acting reasonably,
even if not rationally. When the canons of rational choice prove indetermi-
nate or ambiguous, and fail to prescribe a unique choice under conditions of
uncertainty, the limits of rationality are reached. It does not follow, however,
that chaotic or capricious decisionmaking is the only alternative. Rather it is
possible to decide reasonably, even when rationality has exhausted its force.
For many large decisions at the individual level—where to go to college,
what profession to pursue, whom to marry—rational choice is impotent or
inapposite, yet it is still possible to approach the decision more or less rea-
sonably. Many of the decisions that agencies face have exactly this quality:
the stakes are high, the consequences of the alternatives are shrouded in
uncertainty, and the decision is either a one-time event, or at least will not
209. See supra text accompanying notes 3–7.
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be frequently repeated, so that no strong process of learning through trial
and error is possible.
In this framework, our thesis holds that for purposes of interpreting
section 706(2)(A), “arbitrary and capricious” action is unreasoned agency
action. Just as an individual may have excellent reasons to make a decision
that cannot be fully justified in rational terms, so too an agency may have
excellent reasons to adopt a decision-procedure (like satisficing) that is justi-
fiable by reasons, but yields ultimately nonrational choices in particular
cases. Judges who appreciate the limits of rationality, and the dilemmas that
face reasonable agencies who must act subject to those limits, should inter-
pret the APA’s rejection of arbitrary decisionmaking in ways that take ac-
count of these concerns.
C. Nonjudicial Review
So far we have mentioned two different types of reviewers: generalist
judges, on the one hand, and technocrats in the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, on the other. Our focus is on judges, and on judicial
review for rationality under section 706(2)(A), rather than OIRA review
under relevant statutes and executive orders. For completeness, however, it is
worth asking which, if any, of our claims apply only to judicial review, and
which apply in the intraexecutive setting as well.
Some of our points are not sensitive to the identity of the reviewer. We
suggest that the ideal of rational decisionmaking by agencies, rightly under-
stood, is more capacious and forgiving than is often assumed. We counsel
tolerance of noncomparative policy evaluation and satisficing under uncer-
tainty; of rationally arbitrary decisionmaking under uncertainty; of tradeoffs
that compromise simple accuracy, such as mean-variance tradeoffs and
speed-accuracy tradeoffs; tolerance for agency discretion to decide which
factors are relevant to the goals of statutory policy; and tolerance for agen-
cies who possess tacit expertise acquired through experience, and who thus
have reasons they cannot necessarily explain.
The problem of tacit expertise is worth underscoring in this setting.
That problem lies at the heart of the debate over the relationship between
front line agencies, on the one hand, and OIRA, on the other. In the latest
round of this debate, Lisa Heinzerling, a former counsel and assistant ad-
ministrator at the Environmental Protection Agency, observes that generalist
economists at OIRA fail to understand the nature of the problems line agen-
cies face.210 The OIRA reviewers, often newly minted Ph.D.s without train-
ing or experience in the substance of the issues they confront, are prone to
focus on the most easily observable and quantifiable components of the
210. See Lisa Heinzerling, Inside EPA: A Former Insider’s Reflections on the Relationship
Between the Obama EPA and the Obama White House, 31 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 325, 355–56
(2014).
1404 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1355
problems, to the neglect of less-observable components that line officers
know from long experience to be critical.211
The tempting response to this problem is to simply call for vertical com-
munication: whatever local complexities line agencies perceive can simply be
communicated upwards, and be folded into the process of regulatory analy-
sis.212 But things are not so simple. The OIRA reviewers, on the one hand,
and the line agency officers, on the other, deploy two different and poten-
tially incompatible forms of knowledge. The former deploy explicit, general,
abstract, verbalized, and even quantified knowledge, the sort of knowledge
obtained in a Ph.D. program. The latter deploy local, experiential, how-to
knowledge accumulated through long exposure to the specifics of ever-
evolving problems in the field at hand. The 30-year-old economist fresh
from the University of Chicago will sometimes be simply unable to evaluate,
or perhaps even comprehend, the assumptions, intuitions, and decisionmak-
ing framework of the 60-year-old EPA bureau chief who has, perhaps, been
involved with the problems of coal ash or water-intake structures longer
than the reviewer has been alive. Recall the earlier example—the question
whether automobile executives are bluffing about the capabilities of their
firms and about the costs to those firms of various regulatory outcomes. It is
unclear whether such savvy can be explained, or how the OIRA line reviewer
is supposed to assess it.
On a Hayekian perspective, it is hopeless to think all relevant informa-
tion can be conveyed by line agencies to a centralized overseer like OIRA—a
central planner for the executive branch.213 Agencies learn by doing,214 by
understanding the “circumstances of time and place.”215 The tacit practical
knowledge of line agencies is a form of métis,216 knowing-how rather than
knowing-that, and will by the nature of the case be inaccessible to experts in
OIRA—no matter how technically specialized—who have not themselves
worked through the myriad complexities of implementing general statutory
commands and policies. No amount of meetings between line agencies and
OIRA personnel, or hiring of new OIRA personnel, will convey this tacit
local knowledge to the center. Nor would it be worth the costs in any event.
211. This is a well-known problem in contract theory as well. When there are multiple
tasks, agents may expend too much effort on the readily observable task precisely because that
is the only observable action on which sanction and reward can be conditioned. See Bengt
Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset
Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. (Special Issue) 24, 27–28 (1991).
212. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1838, 1840–42, 1854–56 (2013) (arguing that OIRA should be
elevated because of its information-sharing capacity).
213. See Vermeuele, supra note 199, at 297.
214. Cf. Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Learning While Governing: Expertise
and Accountability in the Executive Branch (2012) (discussing expertise development
and information acquisition in the executive branch).
215. See Hayek, supra note 198, at 521.
216. See James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State 309–41 (1998).
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So the point about tacit expertise applies to OIRA as much as to the
courts. On the other hand, one of our central arguments does not apply to
OIRA at all: the argument that courts may not require agencies to engage in
quantified cost-benefit analysis, even presumptively (unless of course or-
ganic statutes clearly so require). That argument differs from the others on
two counts: it is dependent on the substantive law, which is different for the
courts and for OIRA, and it is dependent on an institutional conception of
the judicial role, which is obviously sensitive to the identity of the reviewer.
As for substantive law, the executive orders governing OIRA review of execu-
tive branch agencies sometimes require (at least as a procedural matter)
quantified cost-benefit analysis insofar as feasible, unless special nonquan-
tifiable factors are present.217 We have argued that there is no such governing
law for courts, however, and indeed that a global judicial requirement of
(presumptive) quantified cost-benefit analysis would be inconsistent with
Congress’s highly variable approach to decisionmaking requirements in reg-
ulatory statutes.
As for the judicial role, we see quantified cost-benefit analysis as a par-
ticular, highly controversial decision-procedure. Under Vermont Yankee and
more recently Perez, courts have no authority to foist such a procedure on
agencies who otherwise possess legal discretion to adopt other decision-pro-
cedures, from the very large space of possibilities.218 Clearly that point also
does not apply to OIRA. As far as law goes, then, we have no quarrel with
quantified cost-benefit analysis internal to the executive branch. As for prac-
tical impact, however, it is also true that an OIRA requirement of cost-bene-
fit analysis, in a world where arbitrariness review does not itself require cost-
benefit analysis for agencies, can sometimes create analytic and pragmatic
awkwardness for agencies. In some settings, it means that agencies will give
reasons in cost-benefit format that are not the actual reasons for the action,
because the cost-benefit analysis was performed only to satisfy OIRA.219
217. By their own terms, these executive orders are not judicially enforceable. See Exec.
Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012)
Nothing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise available judicial review of
agency action. This Executive order is intended only to improve the internal management
of the Federal Government and does not create any right or benefit, substantive or proce-
dural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012) (same);
see also Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1296 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“An Executive Order devoted
solely to the internal management of the executive branch—and one which does not create any
private rights—is not . . . subject to judicial review.”); Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 187
(6th Cir. 1986) (“The Order was intended ‘to improve the internal management of the Federal
government’ and not to confer rights judicially enforceable in private litigation.” (quoting
Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982))).
218. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524, 543–45 (1978).
219. See Heinzerling, supra note 210, at 349–58.
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Conclusion: The Baltimore Gas Era
State Farm and Chevron are said to be two of the pillars of administra-
tive law. Many others before us have noted that they are in some tension,
with Chevron ushering in an era of deferential review of agency legal inter-
pretation and State Farm ushering in an era of robust judicial review of
agency policymaking. The historical reality, however, is actually quite the
contrary. State Farm did not usher in an era of aggressive hard look review.
In the Supreme Court, agencies virtually never lose so-called hard look
cases, and while the lower-court practice is more heterogeneous, and in-
cludes highly intrusive outliers, State Farm review in practice is not system-
atically hard look. It is time for the academic commentary to update.
As far as the law in action is concerned, we live in the era of Baltimore
Gas review. Baltimore Gas made clear (1) that it is generally sufficient that
an agency states the nature of its uncertainty—not that it resolve it; (2) that
agencies are entitled to adopt any rational assumptions to cope with uncer-
tainty, including highly optimistic assumptions, which are just as rational as
highly pessimistic ones; and (3) that courts may not demand the impossible
by requiring agencies to explain why they have chosen the assumptions they
have, as opposed to other assumptions.220 Baltimore Gas review is in fact
more consistent with Supreme Court practice in the past three decades than
is State Farm (at least in its inflated form, as hard look review). When lower
courts have strayed toward a thick form of rationality review, the Court has
been quick to overrule.
Rightly understood, arbitrary and capricious review is thin. It does not
require agencies to use cost-benefit analysis; it does not require the resolu-
tion of scientific uncertainty; it does not require that agencies pick the opti-
mal policy, or the most accurate policy, or the best feasible policy, or
anything of that sort. It simply requires that agencies act based on reasons.
(As we have noted, there is a separate question whether agencies should be
obliged to give reasons for their actions). The set of admissible reasons in-
cludes second-order or higher-order reasons for acting nonrationally or ar-
bitrarily, as opposed to fully specified first-order reasons. Does this mean
the end of judicial review of agency decisionmaking? Not in the slightest.
The Administrative Procedure Act says that agency action may not be arbi-
trary and capricious, and we have proposed a straightforward interpretation
of that command, requiring reasoned decisionmaking—an interpretation
that is not larded with all the fat of current doctrine, and is thus more faith-
ful to the Act’s text.
Commentators often refer to arbitrariness, but no one ever discusses
capriciousness. Perhaps caprice is a useful lens for understanding the narrow
set of circumstances in which agency action should be set aside under
706(2)(A). On our account, an agency’s decision must be upheld unless it is
220. See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 98–106 (1983).
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based on nothing more than caprice, “a sudden, impulsive, and seemingly
unmotivated notion or action.”221
Appendix
Our aggregate statistics comprise a list of all Supreme Court merits deci-
sions involving an arbitrary and capricious holding from 1983–2014. There
are 65 cases total in our data, including State Farm itself. Four of the cases
were technically decided before State Farm, but during the same Term (Oc-
tober Term 1982); an example is Baltimore Gas. The case list was generated
by multiple independent Westlaw searches of “arbitrary and capricious” in
the Supreme Court database(s). From that initial return, we exclude any
habeas or criminal cases that did not involve an agency action and any pure
constitutional challenges that did not involve an agency action.
Coding most of these cases is relatively straightforward. If the agency
wins, the action was not arbitrary and capricious. If the agency loses, it was
arbitrary and capricious. The agency win-rate, so to speak, is simply the
number of wins divided by the total number of cases (wins and losses).
Cases like Judulang v. Holder, in which Chevron Step Two analysis fuses with
arbitrariness review,222 are coded as simple losses for the agency on arbitrari-
ness grounds, thereby biasing the count against our thesis.
A minor difficulty arises in the handful of cases in which an opinion
relies on both statutory and arbitrariness analysis, in the alternative, to rule
against the agency. In these cases, there are three methodological options:
(1) count the case as arbitrary in the numerator and include it in the de-
nominator; (2) count the case as not arbitrary in the numerator and count it
in the denominator; or (3) count the case neither in the numerator nor the
denominator. The first is the most conservative estimate for our analysis; the
second, the most forgiving.
These three approaches produce aggregate arbitrariness loss-rates of (1)
8/64=0.125; (2) 5/64=0.078; (3) 8/61=0.131. This choice, then produces a
range of agency win-rates between 87 percent and 92 percent. The number
of debatable coding decisions is so small as to make no difference. However
specified, our basic point remains: agencies win the overwhelming majority
of arbitrariness challenges in the Supreme Court. When a case clearly in-
volves a mix of statutory and arbitrariness analysis and the agency loses, we
note as much in the case list.
221. Caprice, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/caprice
[h8ttp://perma.cc/UU4K-GFEU].
222. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating that Chevron Step Two
examines whether the agency interpretation is “arbitrary or capricious in substance” (quoting
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011))). For discus-
sion and citations of the episodic fusion of Chevron Step Two with arbitrariness review, see
Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 141.
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Table 1




1982 Burlington N. Inc. 
v. United States




1983 Am. Paper Inst. v. 
Am. Elec. Power 
Serv. Corp.




1983 Balt. Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. Nat. Res. 
Def. Council, Inc.







1983 Heckler v. 
Campbell
461 U.S. 458 HHS Benefits Denial 






1983 Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co.
463 U.S. 29 NHTSA Rescission of a 
rule
Arbitrary
1984 Chevron v. Nat. 
Res. Def. 
Council, Inc.




1984 Heckler v. Ringer 466 U.S. 602 HHS Rule Not 
Arbitrary
1985 Bennett v. Ky. 
Dep’t of Educ.






1985 Heckler v. 
Chaney










1986 Bowen v. Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n
476 U.S. 610 HHS Notice & 
Comment Rules
Arbitrary
1986 Japan Whaling 
Ass’n v. Am. 
Cetacean Soc’y
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1986 Lyng v. Payne 476 U.S. 926 Dep’t. of 
Agric.
Loan denial Not 
Arbitrary
1987 INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca









1988 Bowen v. 
Georgetown 
Univ. Hosp.






1988 City of New York 
v. FCC




1988 EEOC v. 
Commercial 
Office Prods. Co.






1989 Marsh v. Or. Nat. 
Res. Council







1989 Robertson v. 
Methow Valley 
Citizens Council
490 U.S. 332 Forest 
Service
Permit Decision Not 
Arbitrary
1990 Pension Benefit 
Guar. Corp. v. 
LTV Corp.
496 U.S. 633 PBGC Enforcement Not 
Arbitrary
1990 Sullivan v. 
Everhart




1990 Sullivan v. Zebley 493 U.S. 521 HHS Adjudication Arbitrary
1991 Am. Hosp. Ass’n 
v. NLRB




1991 Mobil Oil Expl. & 
Producing Se. 
Inc. v. United 
Distribution Cos.









1992 Arkansas v. 
Oklahoma
503 U.S. 91 EPA Permit Decision Not 
Arbitrary
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1992 INS v. Doherty 502 U.S. 314 Attorney 
General/D
OJ
Denial of Motion 





1992 United States v. 
Alaska






1993 Good Samaritan 
Hosp. v. Shalala










1994 ABF Freight Sys., 
Inc. v. NLRB





Jefferson Univ. v. 
Shalala




1995 Shalala v. 
Guernsey Mem’l 
Hosp.




1996 INS. v. Yueh-
Shaio Yang




1996 Smiley v. Citibank 
(S.D.), N.A.






1997 Glickman v. 
Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott, Inc.






1997 United States v. 
O’Hagan




1998 Allentown Mack 
Sales & Serv., 
Inc. v. NLRB








1998 Regions Hosp. v. 
Shalala




1999 Dickinson v. 
Zurko
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2001 U.S. Postal Serv. 
v. Gregory








2002 Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf 
Power Co.




2002 Ragsdale v. 
Wolverine World 
Wide, Inc.








2002 United States v. 
Fior D’Italia, Inc.





Commc’ns Inc. v. 
FCC












2004 Dep’t of Transp. 
v. Pub. Citizen
541 U.S. 752 Dep’t of 
Transp.




2004 Household Credit 
Servs. v. Pfennig




2004 Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness All.
542 U.S. 55 Dep’t of 
Interior




2005 Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Brand X 
Internet Servs.




2007 Massachusetts v. 
EPA
549 U.S. 497 EPA Decision not to 
regulate
Arbitrary
2007 Nat’l Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. 
Defs. of Wildlife
551 U.S. 644 EPA Permit Decision Not 
Arbitrary
2008 Morgan Stanley 
Capital Grp. Inc. 
v. Pub. Util. Dist. 
No. 1 Cty.
554 U.S. 527 FERC Decision not to 
act
Arbitrary
2008 United States v. 
Eurodif S. A.
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2009 FCC v. Fox 
Television 
Stations, Inc.




2011 Douglas v. Indep. 
Living Ctr. of S. 
Cal., Inc.
132 S. Ct. 
1204




2011 Judulang v. 
Holder






2011 Mayo Found. for 
Med. Educ. & 
Research v. 
United States
131 S. Ct. 
704













2013 Sebelius v. 
Auburn Reg’l 
Med. Ctr.
133 S. Ct. 
817




2014 EPA v. EME 
Homer City 
Generation
134 S. Ct. 
1584
EPA Notice & 
Comment Rules
Not 
Arbitrary
